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Abstract 
During 2015 and 2016 I undertook the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology 
(MAE) while continuing at the Northern Territory (NT) Centre for Disease Control 
(CDC) as the OzFoodNet (OFN) epidemiologist. I completed projects which form part 
of the requirement for attaining this degree and which taught the skills essential for 
good public health practitioners. 
In addition to the numerous routine suspected foodborne outbreak investigations I led as 
chief investigator and OFN epidemiologist, I conducted two cohort studies which 
displayed my competence to investigate acute public health events. The first outbreak I 
investigated was an outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul gastroenteritis amongst students 
who attended a school camp in a remote area of the NT. The results of this investigation 
suggested food or drink at the camp was contaminated by environmental Salmonella. 
There were multiple possible mechanisms for contamination to occur due to poor food 
safety knowledge, poor hygiene and structural deficiencies. I recommended that those 
preparing food in campgrounds and outdoor settings have appropriate knowledge of 
safe food handling procedures and recognise the risks of contaminating food or water 
with pathogens from the environment and appropriately maintaining facilities for food 
preparation and service. 
The second cohort study I conducted was while investigating an outbreak of 
salmonellosis (S. Typhimurium 9) associated with consumption of contaminated duck 
prosciutto at a restaurant. My investigation showed that scientific principles underpin 
safe food handling processes and it is important not to deviate from safe methods, 
particularly when preparing high risk foods. 
I evaluated the syndromic surveillance of adult gastroenteritis at Royal Darwin Hospital 
(RDH). I made a number of recommendations to formalise public health responses to 
alerts and to consider adjusting thresholds. Some outcomes of this evaluation are 
already being implemented.  
I conducted an epidemiological study where I used short message service (SMS) to 
follow up people notified to the Darwin CDC with campylobacteriosis, with the aim of 
detecting point-source outbreaks and estimating overseas acquisition. This project did 
not detect any outbreaks but estimated that at least 21% of campylobacteriosis cases 
were acquired overseas. As a result of this project, SMS has increasingly been used at 
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CDC for disseminating information and is now the primary method for following up 
contacts as part of our measles public health response. 
For my data analysis project I analysed a dataset of patients diagnosed with tuberculosis 
(TB) at the Bairo Pite Cinic (BPC) in Dili, Timor-Leste. The most obvious finding from 
my project was that data quality was poor and large amounts of data were missing. I 
rationalised the number of variables collected and created a new data dictionary by 
generating categorical variables from variables that were previously free-text. At the 
time of writing, a new database was under construction based on the rationalised set of 
variables and data dictionary I created. The ultimate public health impact of my work 
will be a new database and reporting tool that is simple to use and acceptable in a 
limited resource setting. The findings of my project will enable the BPC to more 
efficiently record information from cases of TB diagnosed at the clinic.  
This thesis presents my experience during the MAE program, the skills and knowledge I 
attained and the impact this had on public health in the NT.  
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Notes on this thesis 
I have presented this thesis in five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to my 
MAE experience. This chapter also contains my lesson from the field and my teaching 
exercise which was delivered to the MAE 2017 cohort. 
Chapters two through five each focus on projects I completed as part of the 
requirements of the MAE and are presented in the following order; Investigation of an 
acute public health problem, planning and conducting an epidemiological study, 
evaluating a public health surveillance system and analysing a public health data set. 
Numbering for tables, figures and references restart at each new chapter. 
All work related to these projects is included in their corresponding chapter; this 
includes manuscripts, presentations and all appendices. 
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Introduction and overview of field placement 
Introduction 
Before I enrolled in the Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology), or ‘MAE’, I had 
a 10 year career as a multi-skilled medical scientist working in both diagnostic 
pathology and research laboratories in Brisbane, Darwin, regional and remote Northern 
Territory (NT) and overseas in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. In 2012 I moved to 
the NT Centre for Disease Control (CDC) to take up the position as the OzFoodNet 
(OFN) epidemiologist. I had heard of the MAE program before but it sounded like 
something far beyond my ability. In spite of this I thought I would give it a try. In 
February 2015 I began the MAE while continuing in my normal job.  
The Northern Territory 
I have lived on-and-off in the NT since 2003 when I first came here seeking adventure 
and a different experience. For me, the NT is ‘reality’ but for others it is a very different 
place. The NT is the most sparsely populated jurisdiction in Australia but has the third 
largest area. The northern third of the NT is tropical and experiences 2 seasons; a ‘dry’ 
and a monsoon or ‘wet’. The southern part of the NT is known as the ‘Red Centre’ and 
experiences cold winters and extremely hot summers.  
About half the population of the NT (46%) live in remote or very remote areas
1
 and 
30% of the NT population is Indigenous compared to only 3% Australia wide.
2
 
Unfortunately, Indigenous Territorians experience greater health disadvantage than non-
Indigenous Territorians.  
The NT is also only an hour’s flight by aeroplane to Asia and this is reflected in the 
highly multi-cultural population. The tropical climate and proximity to Asia means that 
there is a myriad of infectious diseases that are acquired locally or which are imported 
on a regular basis.  
My role at the NT CDC 
I am primarily employed as the OFN epidemiologist in the NT. OFN is a network of 
epidemiologists in every state and jurisdiction of Australia that is funded by the 
Commonwealth Government Department of Health.
3
 The role of the OFN 
epidemiologist is to conduct surveillance on foodborne disease, to detect and investigate 
outbreaks and describe the epidemiology of foodborne disease. OFN provides 
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information to food safety agencies and other stakeholders so that they can manage risk, 
train people to investigate foodborne illness and provide information to inform policy. 
The network is overseen by a coordinating epidemiologist and central team based in the 
Office of Health Protection within the Australian Government Department of Health in 
Canberra. 
Although my position is funded by the Commonwealth Government, I am employed by 
the NT Government. My office is in CDC which is based at the Royal Darwin Hospital 
(RDH) campus. My position falls in the surveillance section of CDC. There are 2 other 
members of the surveillance team; the Head of Surveillance, Dr Peter Markey and the 
Data Manager, Mrs Mary Verus. The director of the CDC and the NT’s representative 
on the Communicable Disease Network of Australia (CDNA) is Dr Vicki Krause. 
In addition to my OFN duties I do other tasks as directed by my supervisors at CDC. 
We are a small team so people often get a chance to experience working in other 
sections and when it is busy people always offer to help each other out. 
The NT Department of Health and CDC 
The NT Department of Health (DoH) has 3 service delivery divisions; Central Australia 
Health Service, Top End Health Services and Territory Wide Services. The Centre for 
Disease control is in the Territory Wide Services division as well as Environmental 
Health (EH), Remote Health, Disability, Community Health and Health Development.
4
 
CDC and EH work closely and have legislative responsibility to administer the 
following Acts;
5
 
 Food Act 
 Public Health Act 
 Radiation Protection Act 
 Poisons and Dangerous Drugs Act 
 Therapeutic Goods and Cosmetics Act 
 Tobacco Control Act 
 Volatile Substance Abuse Prevention Act 
 Notifiable Disease Act 
 
15 
 Cancer (Registration) Act 
CDC’s primary function is to control and prevent communicable and non-
communicable diseases in the Northern Territory. CDC has offices in the five major 
urban centres of the NT; 
 Nhulunbuy (East Arnhem region) 
 Darwin (Darwin region) 
 Katherine (Katherine region) 
 Tennant Creek (Barkly region) 
 Alice Springs (Central Australia region) 
The staff at CDC are divided into units, including Sexual Health and Blood Borne 
Viruses (SHBBV), Immunisation (including those staff who maintain the NT 
immunisation register), Surveillance, Community Physician (which includes Injury 
Prevention), Medical Entomology, Community Paediatrics (including a project officer 
who maintains the NT cerebral palsy register), the Rheumatic Heart Disease program 
and the Trachoma program.  
The surveillance section is responsible for undertaking surveillance on more than 90 
notifiable diseases
6
 and mounting the necessary public health responses, including the 
investigation and management of outbreaks. 
CDC provides some clinical services which include those offered by the TB team 
(tuberculosis/nontuberculous mycobacterial/leprosy disease screening, treatment and 
contact tracing) and those offered by the SHBBV team and Clinic 34 Staff (sexual 
health testing, treatment and contact tracing). Clinical staff at CDC also provide an 
immunisation service, run immunisation programs and provide post-exposure 
prophylaxis or vaccinations (i.e. for measles, pertussis contacts or post bat/monkey 
exposure).  
CDC's role also includes developing policies, clinical guidelines and factsheets and 
liaising with other agencies, organisations, media and the public to protect and inform 
the health of Territorians.  
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Public health experience during the MAE tenure  
OzFoodNet 
As the OFN epidemiologist my role mainly involves conducting surveillance of the 
following enteric diseases; salmonellosis, shigellosis, campylobacteriosis, 
cryptosporidiosis, Shiga-toxin producing Escherichia coli (STEC) infection, haemolytic 
uraemic syndrome (HUS), Vibrio food poisoning, invasive Vibrio disease, hepatitis 
A/E, Ciguatera poisoning, listeriosis, yersiniosis, amoebiasis, brucellosis, cholera and 
typhoid. 
Gastroenteritis or suspected food or waterborne disease in more than one person in an 
institution or in those who are suspected to be co-exposed is also notifiable. This is 
typically reported to CDC by clinicians. I follow up these cases by administering a 
hypothesis generating questionnaire. 
I administer hypothesis generating questionnaires to all salmonellosis, shigellosis, 
STEC, HUS, Vibrio food poisoning, hepatitis A/E, listeriosis, amoebiasis and typhoid 
cases notified in the Darwin region. Typically, I will administer between 10-15 
salmonellosis questionnaires per week while the other diseases are less common. I 
provide advice to individual cases on potential exposures and how to minimise 
transmission. The main aim however, is to detect clusters/outbreaks of disease. 
It is my role to conduct syndromic surveillance of adult gastroenteritis presentations to 
RDH daily in order to detect outbreaks or increases in gastroenteritis. An evaluation of 
this surveillance system forms a chapter in this thesis. 
When cases of hepatitis A/E and typhoid are notified, I ensure that an appropriate public 
health response follows. 
There are usually 1-2 outbreaks of enteric disease that I investigate per month. These 
can vary from small outbreaks at child care centres or within families to large restaurant 
outbreaks that result in analytical studies to describe the outbreak. 
I report fortnightly, quarterly and annually to OFN Central in Canberra. I report on 
notification trends, interesting/changing epidemiology and cluster and outbreak 
investigations. OFN conducts enhanced surveillance on all listeriosis cases by collecting 
information on a long list of exposures and laboratory typing data of L. monocytogenes 
isolates. I prepare the national fortnightly surveillance report for the OFN network. 
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Non-foodborne disease surveillance 
In addition to my OFN tasks, I also participated in other surveillance tasks as directed. 
Every morning at CDC we have a morning handover meeting. The staff at CDC 
participate in a roster that sees them manning the ‘on-call phone’ for a day. Being on-
call involves receiving calls from clinicians about diseases that may require follow up, 
following up notifications of disease where a public health response is required, 
collecting enhanced data on various notifiable diseases, answering immunisation 
queries from clinicians and answering queries from the public. At the morning meeting, 
current health issues are discussed as well as breaking media and journal articles and 
other local and international topics that affect public health in the NT. My attendance 
and contribution to the on-call meetings has added to my public health knowledge and 
MAE experience. 
I attend and participate in a number of meetings each week. On Mondays, a Territory 
wide meeting is held whereby the regional CDC offices connect by internet. This 
enables an interactive multi-media meeting to occur. The different sites are able to share 
presentations of data, graphs and figures. It also enables face-to-face communication 
and staff across the Territory are able to familiarise themselves with each other. There is 
an additional fortnightly Territory-wide surveillance meeting on the Thursday following 
fortnightly CDNA meetings. This meeting also involves all NT CDC offices connecting 
to a virtual meeting room via the internet. Each site reports on disease surveillance 
issues or outbreaks in their region, public health follow up they have performed and any 
issues they have related to these issues. The meeting is chaired by the head of 
surveillance who will go through the surveillance and jurisdictional reports presented at 
CDNA, the fortnightly NT surveillance reports and various flu surveillance reports and 
graphs. He will identify trends in notifications or data issues and discuss. The meeting 
also offers an opportunity for education and development for the staff who participate. 
I find that by attending the daily handover meeting, the Monday NT-wide meeting and 
the fortnightly surveillance meeting I learn a lot. It is an easy way to gain experience 
and knowledge rapidly. 
The head of surveillance and I also attend a monthly meeting with the Environmental 
Health (EH) team. 
Some of the other surveillance activities I participated in during my MAE tenure 
included; 
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 generating routine surveillance reports including flu surveillance reports and flu-
tracking
7
 reports 
 acting as the secretary of the NT Zoonosis Committee 
 reporting to the Commonwealth of Australia on the NT’s surveillance of persons 
returning from Ebola affected countries during the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa 
 establishing and managing a NetEpi8 contact tracing database for measles 
notifications in the NT 
 sitting on the listeriosis Series of National Guidelines (SoNG) working group as 
part of the CDNA review of the listeriosis case definition 
 conducting a literature review of the recognition of acute rheumatic fever 
outbreaks as part of a response to increased numbers of acute rheumatic fever in 
a remote Indigenous community in the NT
9,10
 
 assisting to develop and administer questionnaires at 2 remote Indigenous 
communities in order to investigate a cluster of children with high blood lead 
levels
11
 
 assisting to raise public awareness of melioidosis by meeting with stakeholders12 
 participating in the NT CDC conference organising committee 
 being a reviewer for the Northern Territory Disease Control Bulletin. 
Outside of CDC 
In addition to the work I did at CDC I also undertook work for the National Critical 
Care and Trauma Response Centre (NCCTRC). The NCCTRC are based in Darwin and 
their key function is to despatch Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AUSMAT) in 
response to disasters in the Asia-Pacific region.
13
 I am a member of the NCCTRC as a 
medical laboratory scientist and epidemiologist. In 2014 and 2015 I deployed on 
training missions to Timor-Leste to support the annual Tour de Timor mountain bike 
race. I was deployed as a public health officer and as a liaison officer. I gained 
experience at identifying and managing public health concerns in the developing world 
setting as well as media experience on Timorese and Australian television (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Screenshot of interview with Channel 9 News (11 September 2015). 
I also conducted some work for the Bairo Pite Clinic (BPC) in Dili, Timor-Leste. For 
the data analysis project of my MAE I analysed data from the BPC tuberculosis (TB) 
register. The work involved not only analysing a dataset but also attempting to develop 
a new database. This project is described in more detail in Chapter 5 of this bound 
volume. 
In October 2016, I was involved in the screening and data collection phase of a study in 
Timor-Leste which aimed to estimate the prevalence of rheumatic heart disease, scabies 
and impetigo in both urban and rural settings amongst school aged children. I was 
involved in establishing a data collection tool, a data dictionary and the analysis of the 
data in early 2017. There will be two papers submitted to peer reviewed journals as a 
result of this study. 
Summary of MAE course requirements 
I completed the compulsory coursework requirements for the qualification of Master of 
Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology) as per Table 1, as well as the four compulsory field 
projects (Table 2) and the additional required practical activities (Table 3). I was 
involved in a number of other public health projects while an MAE scholar that 
contributed to my development as a public health practitioner. Evidence of these 
projects can be found in the appendices of this chapter.   
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Table 1. Coursework units to qualify for Master of Philosophy (Applied Epidemiology). 
Unit Semester completed 
POPH8316 Outbreak Investigation Semester 1, 2015 
POPH8317 Public Health Surveillance Semester 1, 2015 
POPH8313 Analysis of Public Health Data Semester 2, 2015 
POPH8315 Applied Epidemiological Research Semester 2, 2015 
POPH8914 Issues in Applied Epidemiology Semester 1, 2016 
 
Table 2. Compulsory field projects completed during the MAE. 
Field project Details 
Plan and conduct an 
epidemiological 
study 
 
Using short message service (SMS) as a tool to follow up 
campylobacteriosis notifications. [Chapter 3] 
An outbreak of salmonellosis associated with duck prosciutto at a 
Northern Territory restaurant. [Chapter 2] 
An outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul gastroenteritis after attending a 
school camp in the Northern Territory. [Chapter 2] 
Analyse a public 
health data set 
 
The epidemiology of persons diagnosed with tuberculosis at the Bairo 
Pite Clinic in Timor-Leste. [Chapter 5] 
Using short message service (SMS) as a tool to follow up 
campylobacteriosis notifications. [Chapter 3] 
An outbreak of salmonellosis associated with duck prosciutto at a 
Northern Territory restaurant. [Chapter 2] 
An outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul gastroenteritis after attending a 
school camp in the Northern Territory. [Chapter 2] 
Evaluate a public 
health surveillance 
system 
Evaluation of the Royal Darwin Hospital Emergency Department 
Syndromic Surveillance System. [Chapter 4] 
Investigate an acute 
public health 
problem 
An outbreak of salmonellosis associated with duck prosciutto at a 
Northern Territory restaurant. [Chapter 2] 
An outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul gastroenteritis after attending a 
school camp in the Northern Territory. [Chapter 2] 
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I completed the additional requirements of the MAE as outlined in Table 3. 
Table 3. Additional required practical activities of the MAE program. 
Practical 
competency 
Details 
Literature review A literature review was completed for each of the field projects 
completed above 
Report to a non-
scientific audience 
Worked with other staff members at CDC to develop meliodiosis 
awareness poster [Appendix 1 of this chapter] 
Drafted various media releases during my MAE tenure regarding 
melioidosis, Salmonella, Cryptosporidium and Norovirus. [Appendix 2 
of this chapter] 
Oral presentations 
 
‘An outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul gastroenteritis after attending a 
school camp in the Northern Territory, Australia.’ [Chapter 2, Appendix 
4] 
Presentation at: 
1. 45th OzFoodNet face-to-face meeting, Vibe Hotel Darwin 
Waterfront, Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia, March 2015. 
‘An outbreak of salmonellosis associated with duck prosciutto at a 
Northern Territory restaurant.’ [Chapter 2, Appendix 2] 
Presentation at; 
1. Northern Territory Centre for Disease Control Conference, Charles 
Darwin University, Waterfront Campus, Darwin, Northern Territory 
Australia, September 2015. 
2. Australian National University Research School of Population Health 
Lunchtime Seminar Series, National Centre for Epidemiology and 
Population Health, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, 
February 2016. 
3. 8th South East Asia and Western Pacific Bi-regional TEPHINET 
Scientific Conference, Apsara Palace Resort and Conference Centre, 
Siem Reap, Cambodia, December 2016. 
‘The use of short message service (SMS) to follow up cases of 
Campylobacter gastroenteritis in Darwin, Northern Territory.’ [Chapter 
3, Appendix 2] 
Presentation at; 
1. 49th OzFoodNet face-to-face meeting in Melbourne, Victoria, 
Australia, June 2016. 
2. 2016 Northern Territory Centre For Disease Control Conference, 
TIO Stadium, Darwin, Australia, September 2016. 
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Practical 
competency 
Details 
Publications 1. Draper A, Cook H. “NetEpi – a solution for contact tracing during a 
measles outbreak. [poster]. Presented at the 2015 Public Health 
Association of Australia Communicable Disease Control Conference, 
Brisbane 2015. [Appendix 3 of this chapter] 
2. Kurucz N, Markey P, Draper A, Melville L, Weir E, Davis S, Warchot 
A, Boyd R, Stokeld D. Investigation into high Barmah Forest virus 
disease case numbers reported in the Northern Territory, Australia in 
2012/13. Vector-Borne and Zoonotic Diseases. 2016;16(2):110-116. 
3. Draper A. Enteric disease in the Northern Territory in 2015. The 
Northern Territory Disease Control Bulletin. 2016;23(1):15-24. 
4. Draper ADK, Markey P, Krause V, Davis S. The use of short 
message service (SMS) to follow up cases of Campylobacter 
gastroenteritis in Darwin, Northern Territory. The Northern Territory 
Disease Control Bulletin. 2016;23(2). 
5. Boyd R, McGuinness S, Draper A, Neilson M, Krause V. Melioidosis 
awareness campaign – Don’t get melioidosis. The Northern Territory 
Disease Control Bulletin. 2016:23(1);1-4. 
6. Draper ADK, Morton C, Heath J, Lim J, Schiek A, Krause V, Markey 
P, Davis S. An outbreak of salmonellosis associated with duck 
prosciutto at a Northern Territory restaurant. 2016. Published in 
Communicable Disease Intelligence. [Chapter 2, Appendix 1] 
7. Draper ADK, Morton C, Heath J, Lim J, Markey P. An outbreak of 
Salmonella Saintpaul gastroenteritis after attending a school camp in 
the Northern Territory, Australia. 2016. Published in Communicable 
Disease Intelligence. [Chapter 2, Appendix 3] 
Lesson from the 
field (LFF) 
 
Draper ADK. Estimating incubation periods and exposure times in 
foodborne disease outbreaks. Conducted via teleconference, 
November 2015. [Appendix 4 of this chapter] 
Teaching  “Administering questionnaires when conducting an outbreak 
investigation” 
Delivered to MAE2017 cohort at National Centre for Epidemiology and 
Population Health, March 2016. [Appendix 5 of this chapter] 
 
Lesson from the field 
I chose to present my LFF on estimating exposure times and incubation periods during 
foodborne disease outbreak investigations (Appendix 4 of this chapter). I chose this 
topic because I think it is a useful skill for investigating point-source outbreaks when 
the aetiological agent is unknown. I learned that when delivering a teaching session it is 
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important to define the learning objectives prior to developing the lesson plan and to 
confirm at the end of the lesson that those learning objectives were indeed achieved. I 
learned that it is important to provide unambiguous and easily interpretable questions 
and instructions to students. In the future I will plan to pilot tutorials before delivering 
them to check for ambiguity. The final major learning from my LFF was not to assume 
prior knowledge. I found that some things that I reluctantly included in my teaching 
because I thought they were overly simple, were in fact new and different concepts to 
others, particularly when Microsoft® Excel was involved. 
Teaching to MAE 2017 Cohort 
We chose to deliver a session to the MAE 2017 on administering questionnaires when 
conducting an outbreak investigation (Appendix 5 of this chapter). Again the major 
learning point for me was the need to carefully define the learning objectives of the 
teaching session prior to developing a teaching plan. Tanyth de Gooyer and I did most 
of the planning and development of the task and then minor tasks were delegated to 
other members of the team at the end of the development process. The learning 
objectives really were helpful in this instance because the subject matter we were 
teaching had the potential to veer off task. Learning objectives were useful for both 
tutors and students, to reinforce the principles of what was being taught. I learned that 
some people are comfortable presenting ‘off the cuff’ and some people are very anxious 
about teaching others. I learned that although I wasn’t too daunted by this exercise, 
some people were. By having an organised learning plan and documents prepared well 
in advance, people are given the opportunity to feel more comfortable in their role as 
teachers.  
Activities undertaken in addition to 4 core MAE projects 
In addition to the 4 MAE core projects I was also involved in 2 prevalence studies in 
Timor-Leste. My role in both projects was to develop data dictionaries and 
questionnaires and then to clean and analyse data for the principle researchers. I was 
also involved in collecting data on the ground in Timor-Leste. At the time of writing 
this thesis, both of these studies were in the write-up phase.  
The first study was a study to determine the prevalence of scabies and impetigo in 
school children in Timor-Leste in both the capital, Dili and in rural Ermera. The second 
study was to determine the prevalence of borderline and definite rheumatic heart disease 
in Timor-Leste, again in both urban and rural settings. 
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My participation in these 2 studies taught me the importance of continual engagement 
with principle researchers about data because there needs to be communication of 
clinical and statistical information. Secondly, in both of the studies there were people 
with varying proficiency in the Timorese language, Tetum who were asking 
questionnaires and recording responses. One question in particular, “How many people 
usually live in your house?” created an unexpected learning opportunity for me. Some 
of the malae (foreigners) just asked the question and recorded the response from the 
Timorese kids while some of the other malae who were more proficient in Tetum and 
the local Timorese interviewers would interrogate further and ask the kids to count out 
how many people lived in their house. It became evident that when asked how many 
people lived in their house, the Timorese kids were initially only reporting the number 
of children in their house, but when prompted also included their parents. I learned from 
this that for my next study in Timor-Leste I will aim to pilot the questionnaire 
beforehand and also deliver more training to interviewers. 
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Appendix 1. Meliodosis awareness poster 
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Appendix 2. Media releases I helped to write (2015-2016) 
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Appendix 3. NetEpi – a solution for contact tracing during a measles 
outbreak [poster]. Presented at the 2015 Public Health Association of 
Australia Communicable Disease Control Conference, Brisbane 2015 
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Appendix 4. Lesson from the field exercise (November 2015) 
 
Lesson from the Field 
Anthony Draper – November 2015 
 
Foodborne outbreak investigations 
Estimating incubation periods and exposure times 
This lesson from the field (LFF) exercise is a self-directed learning exercise and will be 
available on Wattle from 11/11/2015. 
Please email all answers to anthony.draper@nt.gov.au by Friday 20/11/2015. 
If anybody has problems please call me on (08)89227635 or contact me by email.  
Instructions 
This LFF will require you to use Microsoft excel. 
It consists of some simple data manipulation and use of pivot tables. 
Instructions are highlighted with red titles, questions in blue. 
The technique used in this LFF is based on the World Health Organisation publication,  
“Foodborne Disease Outbreaks. Guidelines for Investigation and Control”   
This document can be found at: 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/foodborne_disease/outbreak_guidelines.pdf  
You might also find the QLD Health document, “Foodborne pathogens compendium 
for outbreak investigations – 2010” useful. It can be found at 
http://www.health.qld.gov.au/ph/documents/cdb/30586.pdf  
 
Learning objectives 
By the end of this LFF you should be able to: 
 Create a simple epicurve using pivot tables in Microsoft excel.  
 Complete the following tasks for an outbreak where only the onset time of 
illness is known (i.e. the pathogen, time of exposure and incubation 
period are unknown); 
o Calculate the range of onset times. 
o Use the range of onset times and the median onset time to 
estimate the probable exposure time of an outbreak. 
o Estimate the median incubation period of an outbreak based on the 
probable exposure time. 
 Determine the likely aetiology of an outbreak based on this estimated 
incubation period and symptomology. 
 
Note: The data used in this LFF is from a real outbreak in the Northern Territory but has 
been modified to maintain confidentiality.  
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Introduction to the LFF exercise 
When investigating an outbreak of foodborne illness it is sometimes easy to determine 
a particular meal or time of the day when people ate the food that made them sick. This 
is usually the case when people who are otherwise unknown to each other are 
exposed to contaminated foods at restaurants or at takeaways. These people come 
from different suburbs and households and the only thing they have in common is that 
they ate at that particular restaurant or takeaway at the same time. 
 
Determining which particular meal or food made people sick becomes more difficult 
when you deal with groups who have shared multiple meals together over multiple 
days. This problem often presents when investigating outbreaks amongst members of 
the same family, bus tour groups, school camping groups and people on cruise ships. If 
you know the pathogen, you know the likely incubation period and can work back to 
determine a likely meal. However in remote locations in particular, lab results can take 
time to come back and it is important to determine a likely aetiology of an outbreak 
rather than waiting for these lab results.  
 
Background to outbreak 
It is Thursday November 12th 2015. You are working in the surveillance section at the 
Centre for Disease Control in Darwin. You receive a call from the headmaster at a 
primary school in Darwin who tells you almost half of one particular class is away sick 
from school. He also tells you that this class were on a school bus trip the week before. 
You manage to contact all of the sick kids and you create a simple line-listing which is 
attached to this LFF. 
 
Instruction 1 
1. Open the spreadsheet called “LFF Draper Exercise 1”. 
 
Using pivot tables, let’s create an epicurve. 
2. Click into cell A1 and then click ‘CTRL + A’ to select all cells. 
 
3. Go to the command ribbon in Microsoft excel and select the ‘Insert’ tab and then 
select ‘Insert Pivot Table’. 
 
4. Click ‘OK’. 
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5. In the newly opened pivot table, drag ‘ONSET DATE’ from the PivotTable Field List 
box on the right hand side into the Row Labels box below it. Similarly, drag ‘ONSET 
DATE’ into the Values box below it. Ensure that in the Values box it says ‘Count of 
ONSET DATE’. 
 
 
6. Using the information from your newly created pivot table, create an appropriately 
labelled epicurve of the outbreak. 
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Question 1    
a) What kind of outbreak does the shape of the epicurve suggest? 
Point source outbreak 
The WHO guidelines for investigating outbreaks of foodborne illness state that if the 
shape of the epidemic curve suggests a point source outbreak, we can use the median 
onset time and range of onset times to determine the probable time of exposure: 
 
There are 3 steps 
1) Determine the median time of onset of illness. 
2) Calculate the time between occurrence of the first and last case (width of the 
epicurve). 
3) Subtract this amount of time from the median onset time to obtain the probable time 
of exposure. 
 
Instruction 2 
Rather than just looking at the data, try using Microsoft excel functions to answer the 
following questions. 
Question 2 
a)  What is the median onset date and time in this outbreak? 
7/11/2015 11:59pm (Fx=median(E2:E26)) 
a) What is the earliest onset date and time in the outbreak?   
7/11/2015 7:00pm (Fx=min(E2:E26)) 
b) What is the latest onset date and time in the outbreak?   
9/11/2015 8:00am (Fx=max(E2:E26)) 
c) What is the range (in hours) of the onsets in the outbreak? 
37hours (Fx=(latest onset time – earliest onset time)*24) 
d) What is the probable exposure time in this outbreak using the method 
outlined above? 
6/11/2015 10:59am (~11am)  
Working: Exposure time = median onset time – range of onset times  
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Instruction 3 
Go back to your line listing. Add a new column called PROBABLE INCUBATION 
PERIOD. 
Calculate the PROBABLE incubation period for each case based on our probable time 
of exposure. 
Question 3 
a) What is the median probable incubation period 
37 hours 
b) What is the range of the probable incubation period 
33 hours to 69 hours. 
Instruction 4 
You are able to obtain a rough itinerary of the school bus trip from one of the teachers. 
It is found below. 
 
Friday 6
th
 November 2015 
7.25 Arrive at school 
8.30  Leave for Crocodile Creek 
9.15 Arrive at Crocodile Creek  
11.00  Lunch together  
12.30 Leave for Humpty Dumpty camp site 
2.30 Arrive at Humpty Dumpty camp site – Set up camp  
3.30 Snack/Afternoon tea  
  Activities 
5.00 Showers 
6.00 Dinner  
7.00 Activities  
8.30 Supper & prayers 
9.30 Bed (lights out, noise out 10pm) 
Saturday 7
th
 November 2015 
7.25 Wake up, pack up and breakfast 
8.30  Leave for Wallaby Flat 
9.15 Arrive at Wallaby Flat – swimming and free time  
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11.00  Lunch together  
12.30 Leave for Mt Alligator camp site 
2.30 Arrive at Mt Alligator camp site – Set up camp  
3.30 Snack/Afternoon tea  
  Activities 
5.00 Showers 
6.00 Dinner  
7.00 Activities  
8.30 Supper & prayers 
9.30 Bed (lights out, noise out 10pm) 
Sunday 8
th
 November 2015 
7.30 Wake up, shower, set up breakfast 
8.00  Breakfast 
9.30 Bus leaves Mt Alligator camp site 
12.30  Lunch at Never Never Downs 
1.30 Bus leaves Never Never Downs 
4.30  Bus arrives at the Last Stop Roadhouse – set up camp 
6.00 Dinner 
7.30  Night stuff 
9.00 Supper & prayers 
9.30  Bed, lights out at 10 again. 
 
Monday 9
th
 November 2015 
7.30 Wake up 
8.00 Breakfast 
8.00  Pack up camp  
9.00 Depart Last Stop Roadhouse for Alice Springs 
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11.00 Arrive Alice Springs and set up camp 
12.30 Lunch  
1.30 Activities 
2.30 Hiking excursion 
6.00 Dinner 
7.30  Night stuff 
9.00 Supper & prayers 
9.30  Bed, lights out at 10 again. 
 
Tuesday 10
th
 November 2015 
7.30 Wake up 
8.00 Breakfast 
8.00  Pack up camp  
9.00 Depart Alice Springs camp for airport 
11.00 Arrive Alice Springs airport  
12.30 Depart Alice Springs  
6.00 Arrive Darwin Airport 
6.30  Parents collect children – end of camp 
 
Question 4 
a) Which meal is likely the cause of the outbreak? 
 Lunch on 7th November 2015 
 
Question 5 
In the line-listing, cases’ symptoms are recorded. 
Complete the following table; 
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Symptom Number with symptom % of cases with symptom 
Fever 18/26 69% 
Nausea 23/26 88% 
Vomiting 11/26 42% 
Abdo pain 24/26 92% 
Lethargy 23/26 88% 
Headache 21/26 81% 
Diarrhoea 27/28 96% 
Bloody diarrhoea 8/25 32% 
 
Below is a table of common agents of foodborne disease and their incubation periods 
and symptoms. 
Agent Incubation period Symptoms Duration of 
illness 
Salmonella spp. 6-72 hours Diarrhoea (often 
bloody), abdominal pain, 
fever, nausea, vomiting 
2-5 days 
Shigella spp. 12-96 hours Watery diarrhoea (often 
bloody), abdominal pain, 
fever, vomiting 
4-7 days 
Campylobacter 
spp. 
1-10 days Acute diarrhoea, 
vomiting, fever, 
abdominal cramps 
2-5 days 
Norovirus 24-48 hours Sudden onset nausea, 
vomiting, diarrhoea, 
abdominal cramps, 
myalgia, low grade fever 
1-3 days 
Rotavirus 24-72 hours Vomiting, watery 
diarrhoea, malaise, 
headache, low grade 
fever 
4-8 days 
 
 
Question 6 
Based on the probable incubation period you calculated earlier in Question 3b) 
and the symptoms described in Question 5, what agent is the likely cause of the 
outbreak? 
Salmonella Spp. 
END OF EXERCISE  
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Appendix 5. Teaching exercise to first year MAE scholars (MAE 2017 
cohort) 
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CHAPTER 2. INVESTIGATE AN 
ACUTE PUBLIC HEALTH 
PROBLEM 
An outbreak of salmonellosis associated with duck prosciutto at a Northern 
Territory restaurant 
An outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul gastroenteritis after attending a school 
camp in the Northern Territory, Australia 
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Prologue 
I have been the OzFoodNet (OFN) epidemiologist in the Northern Territory (NT) since 
2012. It is my role not only to conduct surveillance on foodborne disease but to 
investigate outbreaks of enteric disease in the NT as well as participate in 
multijurisdictional outbreak investigations (MJOI) when outbreaks affect multiple states 
and territories across Australia.  
During my time as a Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) scholar I 
was the lead investigator in all local gastroenteritis outbreak and cluster investigations 
in the NT. This involved conducting surveillance of foodborne disease by traditional 
laboratory methods as well as syndromic surveillance at the Royal Darwin Hospital 
(RDH) Emergency Department (ED). I also undertook investigations as a standard 
response to public complaints and concerns about food premises. These complaints 
were referred to the Centre of Disease Control (CDC) from our colleagues at the NT 
Department of Health Environmental Health (EH) Branch. 
Over the duration of my student tenure I investigated a total of 66 outbreaks of non-
foodborne and suspected foodborne gastroenteritis (as at 30 June 2017). These outbreak 
investigations varied in size and complexity. The smallest outbreak involved the 
suspected person-to-person spread of norovirus within a single family. The largest 
outbreak I investigated was a Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak that affected 38 people at a 
large construction plant
1
 and was part of a large nation-wide MJOI associated with 
contaminated bean sprouts.
2
 The outbreak investigations I led ranged in complexity 
from simple case series to cohort studies. I was also involved, in the investigation of 
increased lead levels in Indigenous children in a cluster of 3 remote communities
3
 and 
the investigation of an increase in acute rheumatic fever (ARF) in a single remote 
Indigenous community.
4,5
 As part of my role with OFN, I accompanied EH officers on 
their site inspections as part of outbreak responses when possible. I visited restaurants 
and a school camp in response to local outbreaks and two melon farms as part of an 
MJOI which determined that rockmelons produced in the NT were responsible for S. 
Hvittingfoss infections in multiple southern jurisdictions of Australia.
6
 
The body of this chapter consists of two papers I wrote during my time as an MAE 
scholar. Both papers have been published in Communicable Disease Intelligence.
7,8
 The 
first paper reports the investigation of an outbreak of gastroenteritis caused by S. 
Typhimurium phage type (PT) 9 associated with eating duck prosciutto at a 
 
58 
restaurant.
7,9
 The second paper reports an outbreak of S. Saintpaul gastroenteritis among 
people who attended a school camp.
8
 This outbreak was investigated prior to 
commencement of the MAE but much of the writing up occurred during the first six 
months of my candidature. I gave oral presentations on both of these outbreaks at 
various conferences and meetings nationally and internationally. These presentations are 
included as appendices. 
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Abstract 
Introduction 
This chapter details two major public health investigations I investigated during my 
time as a Master of Epidemiology (MAE) scholar. The first was an outbreak of 
Salmonella Typhimurium phage type 9 (STm9) at a Darwin restaurant. The second 
outbreak was one which occurred just prior to commencing the MAE but much of the 
epidemiological investigation occurred while I was a scholar. It was an outbreak of S. 
Saintpaul gastroenteritis amongst students who had attended a school camp in a remote 
part of the Northern Territory. 
Methods 
Both outbreaks were investigated via an initial case series, environmental investigations 
and a cohort study. We performed the retrospective cohort studies via telephone using 
structured questionnaires developed from menus. Patrons at the restaurant outbreak 
were contacted using the restaurant’s electronic booking system which contained a 
name and phone number for each table as well as an itemised bill. Attendees at the 
school camp were also asked about activities and other environmental exposures. 
Data were collected and entered into Microsoft Excel 2010 (Microsoft, USA) and 
analysed using Intercooled StataIC® 13 (StataCorp, USA). We calculated relative risks 
(RR) with 95 per cent confidence intervals (CI) and p values were considered 
significant at the 0.05 level. Fisher’s exact test was used when counts were <5. When a 
RR was infinite, exact logistic regression was used to calculate an odds ratio (OR) and 
95% CI. The χ2 test was used to analyse gender. Age was analysed using the Mann 
Whitney Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
Results 
Contaminated duck prosciutto was identified as the likely cause of the STm9 outbreak 
and was consumed by all cases. Salmonella was not detected in any food samples but 
samples of duck prosciutto demonstrated bacterial contamination. The restaurant used 
inappropriate methodology for curing the duck prosciutto. 
The epidemiological investigation of the S. Saintpaul outbreak at the school camp was 
inconclusive but suggested that environmental contamination of food or drink occurred. 
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The environmental health inspection of the campground highlighted multiple 
opportunities for contamination to occur. 
Conclusions 
These two outbreak investigations demonstrate the experience I gained during the MAE 
program and my increased confidence to conduct epidemiological investigations. We 
published the first reported outbreak of salmonellosis associated with duck prosciutto 
and recommended that restaurants should consider purchasing pre-made cured meats, or 
if preparing them on site, ensure that they adhere to safe methods of production. Our 
second outbreak investigation highlighted the risks of food or drink being contaminated 
with environmental Salmonella, and the importance of preparing food and drink safely 
in campground settings.  
Lessons learned 
I had experience investigating outbreaks of enteric disease before I began the MAE but I 
feel that my skills have been enhanced as a result of completing the course. I was able to 
immediately apply my learnings from the unit POPH8316 Outbreak Investigation into 
my work practices. I have adapted the processes, templates and analysis methods I 
learned during the course block and adopted a more systematic approach to 
investigating outbreaks.  
While investigating the outbreak of S. Typhimurium PT9 associated with consuming 
duck prosciutto, I learned of the usefulness of exact logistic regression analysis for 
calculating 95% confidence intervals. In cohort studies, when a square in an 
epidemiologist’s 4 x 4 table contains zero, Stata® is unable to calculate a 95% 
confidence interval. Exact logistic regression (command: 
) allows the degree of uncertainty 
around relative risks to be communicated more effectively than simply stating that a 
95% confidence interval is ‘undefined’. 
While investigating the outbreak of S. Saintpaul amongst attendees at the school camp, I 
learned that it is important to compare the statistical outputs of a cohort study with the 
biological plausibility of the potential exposure, the environmental assessment and the 
timing of an outbreak. In this outbreak, we began the cohort study with no hypothesis 
and included over 100 exposure variables. We were somewhat surprised that the cohort 
study indicated that the consumption of cordial by camp attendees at one particular meal 
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was significantly associated with illness. However, when we looked at the epicurve and 
the timing of the outbreak, the EH team’s observations during their inspections and the 
biological plausibility that the cordial could have been the vehicle for S. Saintpaul 
infection, it strengthened our belief that the cordial was indeed the most likely cause of 
the outbreak.  
Public health impact 
The investigation of the outbreak of salmonellosis associated with eating duck 
prosciutto at the restaurant resulted in duck prosciutto being immediately removed from 
its menu. The restaurant was served with formal legal notices prohibiting it from 
serving raw meat dishes prepared on site. The publication of this outbreak investigation 
report in a peer reviewed journal highlights the risk of Salmonella infection from duck 
meat and in particular duck prosciutto. Novel foods like duck prosciutto are increasingly 
emerging on to the Australian culinary scene and it is important that people and 
restaurants preparing these foods establish and implement food safety procedures in 
order to limit the potential for such outbreaks to occur. Scientific principles underpin 
safe food handling processes and it is important not to deviate from safe methods, 
particularly when handling raw high risk foods which are becoming increasingly 
popular in Australian restaurants and homes. Restaurants should evaluate the benefit of 
preparing high-risk foods on site versus purchasing them from reliable suppliers. 
The investigation of the outbreak of S. Saintpaul among camp attendees resulted in the 
camp proprietor being issued with a number of formal legal notices to address issues 
identified by the EH team. The proprietor voluntarily closed the camp in order to 
address the issues identified. The camp proprietor was directed to treat the drinking 
(bore) water with chlorine prior to its use as a potable drinking water supply and to 
make significant refurbishments or replace the kitchen facilities. The publication of this 
outbreak investigation report highlights the risks of environmental Salmonella and the 
lengths people must go to in order to ensure the safe production, processing and 
consumption of food in camp settings. 
Recommendations 
It is important that people and restaurants preparing foods establish and implement food 
safety procedures in order to limit the potential outbreaks to occur. It is important not to 
deviate from safe methods, particularly when handling raw high risk foods which are 
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becoming increasingly popular in Australian restaurants and homes. Restaurants should 
evaluate the benefit of preparing high-risk foods on site versus purchasing them from 
reliable suppliers. 
The public needs to understand the risks of contaminating food or drinking water with 
environmental Salmonella. They can minimise the risk by undertaking safe production, 
processing and consumption of food in camp settings and by appropriately maintaining 
and sanitising facilities. 
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Appendix 1. Journal article: An outbreak of salmonellosis associated 
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Abstract 
Introduction 
Campylobacter is a major cause of foodborne gastroenteritis in the Northern Territory 
(NT) but our detection of outbreaks is low. This study examines the effectiveness of 
using SMS to follow up campylobacter cases, to increase outbreak detection and collect 
risk factors.   
Methods 
From November 2015 to April 2016 campylobacteriosis cases aged 5 years and over in 
the Darwin region were sent an SMS message asking for details of food businesses 
eaten at and overseas travel in the week prior to illness. A second SMS asking if others 
were unwell was sent if cases reported eating at a food business. Thresholds for further 
investigation were ≥3 cases eating at the same franchise of a food chain, or ≥2 cases 
eating at the same non-franchise food business, within a 2 week period. Records were 
kept of resources required for follow up. 
Results 
Of the 97 eligible cases sent an SMS, 48 replied (response rate 49%). Median time to 
response was 19 minutes (Range 1 minute to 8 days). Females were 1.8 times (95% CI 
1.2 – 2.6) more likely to respond than males (p<0.05). Twenty three (48%) respondents 
reported patronising a food business during their incubation period but no reports 
reached further investigation thresholds. Overseas travel was reported by 20/48 (42%), 
with the majority (13/20) reporting travel to Bali, Indonesia. On average, less than 5 
minutes was required to follow up each case. 
Conclusions 
While no outbreaks were detected, SMS appears to be a low-cost and rapid method of 
following up campylobacteriosis cases. Automated SMS could be used for other types 
of public health follow up, although will need to be combined with other approaches 
when 100% ascertainment is needed. 
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Prologue 
I have been the OzFoodNet (OFN) epidemiologist in the Northern Territory (NT) since 
2012 and in that time it has not been standard process to perform follow-up on sporadic 
campylobacteriosis notifications. In the NT, the traditional way to follow up sporadic 
notifications of other enteric disease such as shigellosis and salmonellosis is to 
administer a standardised hypothesis generating questionnaire via telephone, which is 
time-consuming.  
A disadvantage that is inherent with telephoning people from the offices at CDC is that 
our telephone numbers are ‘private’ numbers. i.e. our phone numbers are not displayed 
on the screens of the people we are calling. In the age of telemarketing, there is a 
reluctance sometimes to accept phone calls from private number callers. I have been 
using short message service (SMS) for a number of years at CDC as an ad hoc method 
of counteracting this. Anecdotally I had found that sending an SMS telling people that 
the CDC wanted to contact them usually resulted in them almost instantaneously 
answering the private number that they had previously ignored. 
I wanted to trial SMS as a follow up method as I hypothesised that it could be a way of 
capturing additional data while using minimal additional resources both in terms of 
manpower and cost. I also wanted to explore the use of SMS as a way of following up 
campylobacteriosis notifications because I wanted to see whether I could detect any 
outbreaks or clusters of disease and to determine how many cases in the Darwin area 
were acquired overseas, particularly from popular holiday destinations such as Bali.  
I was involved in all aspects of this project including the design of the project, the 
sending of SMS messages, the collation of responses, the establishment of outbreak and 
cluster investigation thresholds and the collection, entry and analysis of all data. 
With the assistance of my supervisors I wrote a report of this project that was published 
in the Northern Territory Disease Control Bulletin in June 2016.
1
 I also delivered two 
oral presentations at national conferences and a poster at an international conference on 
this project. 
Lessons learned 
I enjoyed undertaking this project as using SMS was something that I wanted to explore 
for some time and had the potential to immediately impact on my daily work processes. 
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I learned that although the project seemed at face value to be simple and straight 
forward, having a clear and well defined project plan is critical.  
One of my major learnings was around the process of establishing thresholds for cluster 
and outbreak investigations. This was different from the normal surveillance work I do 
because in this instance we established alert thresholds based on exposures rather than 
outcomes. 
Public health impact 
This project provided an evidence base for whether CDC should consider using SMS 
for the follow up of diseases. We showed that using SMS places minimal extra burden 
on public health staff but it is not acceptable to use as a sole method for engaging with 
the public if a 100% response rate is desired.  
We showed that when information needs to be disseminated and no response, or a 
limited and well defined response sought, SMS should be considered as a primary 
communication tool for communicating with the public. Conventional telephone should 
be used to communicate with those who do not respond to SMS communication. 
The results of this project can influence daily practice at CDC and help to improve 
workflow and allocation of resources. SMS may continue to be used in the future for the 
follow up of campylobacteriosis and is being considered for the follow-up of other 
enteric diseases, particularly when the amount of cases requiring telephone interviews 
exceeds the capacity of the public health unit. Although travellers are generally aware of 
‘Bali belly’ and the risk of enteric disease when travelling to countries in Southeast 
Asia, media alerts could be issued prior to peak travel times, particularly school 
holidays. Further studies could be done to identify particular risks amongst travellers 
returning from overseas travel with campylobacteriosis.  
In response to 2 imported cases of measles in March 2017, we used SMS as the primary 
method for contacting measles contacts. We sent out an SMS and asked members of the 
public to call us back so that we could ascertain their risk and provide advice or 
treatment when appropriate. We managed to contact over 700 people in 2 days and it 
proved to be more efficient than the previous methods of telephoning contacts and 
leaving messages. SMS has now been adopted as the frontline method for following up 
contacts in response to notifications of measles cases. 
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Recommendations 
Automated SMS should be used increasingly at the NT CDC for public health follow 
up, as it is inexpensive and places minimal extra burden on public health staff. It should 
be combined with other methods of communication however when a 100% response 
rate is required. 
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Appendix 3. Stata .do file for analysing data collected by SMS 
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Appendix 4. Poster – “The use of short message service (SMS) to follow 
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Presented at the 8
th
 South East Asia and Western Pacific Bi-regional TEPHINET 
Scientific Conference, Siem Reap, Cambodia, November 2016.  
 
 
132 
Appendix 5. Establishing thresholds 
Establishing thresholds for investigating clusters associated with food businesses was 
difficult. An industry survey in 2014 found that 45% of Australians eat from a fast food 
restaurant every 4 weeks, with 42% visiting McDonalds, 29% visiting Subway, 23% 
visiting KFC and 16% visiting Hungry Jack’s.2 There is currently no reliable food 
frequency information available in the NT. There is a food frequency survey underway 
in Victoria, and the information collected is sometimes used in outbreaks that are 
occurring in the southern states of Australia.
3
 However the NT is sufficiently different 
in terms of demographics, climate and access to food, and with Victoria at the opposite 
end of the continent, it would be inappropriate to use this data. The cluster investigation 
thresholds established for this project were arbitrary and consistent with those used to 
investigate clusters of salmonellosis in the NT.  
The threshold for investigating a potential cluster of foodborne campylobacteriosis 
associated with a food establishment, needed to be sensitive enough to detect a potential 
cluster but specific enough to minimise unnecessarily investigating false alerts. In the 
case of campylobacteriosis, we took into account three factors when establishing 
thresholds.  
Firstly, the probability of an exposure occurring was considered. The probability of 3 
people attending the same national fast food restaurant franchise in any fortnight was 
considered to be high,
2
 especially considering the limited options in a small city like 
Darwin. The probability of 2 people attending the same non-franchise restaurant or café 
in a fortnight was considered low in comparison. 
Secondly, the probability of being infected with Campylobacter was considered. 
Although one does not necessarily expect to contract campylobacteriosis on a weekly 
basis, it is the most commonly notified foodborne disease in Australia with 23,705 
notifications nationwide in 2016
4
 and an estimated 179,000 infections per year taking 
into account those cases of illness not notified.
5
 As such we considered 
campylobacteriosis to be a reasonably common risk to the population. 
Thirdly we considered the seriousness of campylobacteriosis when establishing our 
threshold. Although up to 1% of cases can go on to develop reactive arthritis and 0.4% 
may develop Gullian Barré Syndrome,
6
 campylobacteriosis is generally a non-life 
threatening, self-limiting illness. We therefore considered campylobacteriosis to be a 
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non-serious disease. This is opposed to for example, haemolytic uraemic syndrome 
(HUS), where it is likely that an epidemiological and environmental health investigation 
of a premises would occur immediately even after a single case. This is because, in 
contrast to campylobacteriosis the probability of getting HUS is extremely low and it 
has potentially serious outcomes. The sensitivity of the threshold needs to be a balance 
between triggering false alerts and the potential seriousness of the disease, which 
ultimately leads to the need to undertake public health action. 
The thresholds for cluster investigation were established as follows and were consistent 
with those used to investigate clusters of salmonellosis in the NT; 
 if the same branch of a national fast food chain was reported 3 times within a 2 
week period, or  
 if the same non-franchise food business was reported twice in a 2 week period.  
When reflecting on my choice of threshold I considered 2 different scenarios; 
 if 3 people were notified with campylobacteriosis and reported attending the 
same national fast food franchise in the fortnight before they were ill, 
 if 2 people were notified with HUS, a much more severe and life threatening 
illness, and reported attending the same premises in the fortnight before they 
were ill. 
In the instance of campylobacteriosis, an epidemiological investigation would likely not 
occur unless the people reported eating the same food at around the same time. An 
environmental health investigation would most likely only take place if this could be 
established. Eating at the same national fast food franchise
2
 in Darwin within a fortnight 
and getting campylobacteriosis, although not expected, are both relatively common 
events.
4,5
  
In summary, establishing thresholds based on known frequency of exposures in the 
population is a scientific exercise. However, when normal exposure frequencies are not 
known or available in a population, establishing thresholds for cluster investigations 
becomes more of an art. The lesson learned is that it is important to justify why you 
establish a threshold and I believe it should be determined by the reasonable probability 
of experiencing that exposure in normal life, the probability of getting sick in normal 
life and the seriousness of the disease to be investigated.   
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Prologue and my role 
The OzFoodNet (OFN) epidemiologist and head of surveillance at the Northern 
Territory (NT) Centre for Disease Control (CDC) receive a daily automated email that 
informs them of the number of adults presenting to the Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) 
Emergency Department (ED) the previous day with diarrhoeal illness. This system is 
known as the RDH Emergency Department Syndromic Surveillance System (EDSSS). 
The daily email generated by the RDH EDSSS is monitored with the aim of detecting 
point-source outbreaks of foodborne disease, particularly those arising from restaurant 
or other food business settings.  
The design and operation of this surveillance system has not been formally evaluated 
since it began operating in October 2010. 
I have worked in the OFN epidemiologist role since 2012 and have experience 
interacting with the system, responding to alerts and investigating outbreaks of 
gastroenteritis. My role in this project was to undertake the evaluation by designing the 
evaluation, analysing data and interacting with stakeholders. As the main user of the 
EDSSS I have been able to implement some of the findings of the evaluation into the 
operation of system. 
Lessons learned 
This was my first experience in evaluating a public health surveillance system. I 
enjoyed systematically evaluating the surveillance system against specific criteria and 
realising that there is probably no ‘perfect’ surveillance system in existence. This 
evaluation enabled me to appreciate the strengths of the surveillance system and also 
understand its weaknesses - which are probably more important.  
I learned that if a surveillance system (like anything in life) doesn’t create unnecessary 
work and doesn’t cost too much, users are likely to accept it in spite of its weaknesses 
and limitations.   
Public health impact 
At the time of writing, new practices from this evaluation were already being 
implemented. Namely, EDSSS alerts were assigned an outbreak identification (ID) 
number and entered into the OFN NT outbreak register in order to document the 
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response that was mounted when the EDSSS signalled, and the findings of each 
investigation. 
As at December 2016, the EDSSS signalled 4 times since the evaluation was concluded 
in November 2015. There were 2 signals due to point source restaurant based outbreaks 
connected to a nationwide outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul (associated with 
contaminated bean sprouts) and a further signal due to an outbreak of Staphylococcal 
toxin poisoning associated with contaminated noodles. These outbreaks fulfilled the 
criteria of those outbreaks that this evaluation concluded were likely to be detected the 
EDSSS. This is evidence that the findings of this evaluation were relevant.  
This evaluation recommended a standardised approach to record the response to EDSSS 
triggers and by following these recommendations we may be able to better evaluate the 
usefulness of the system in the future, especially in terms of the public health impact of 
individual triggers. 
The findings of this report will help to inform the NT CDC about the usefulness of 
syndromic surveillance for gastroenteritis at RDH. It may also help to inform NT CDC 
about the usefulness of syndromic surveillance for other diseases and throughout the 
Territory.  
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge my supervisors, Dr Peter Markey, Dr Vicki Krause and Dr 
Stephanie Davis for their valuable feedback on my evaluation and report. I would also 
like to acknowledge Dr Kerri Viney who was the course convenor for POPH8317 
Public Health Surveillance at the National Centre for Epidemiology and Population 
Health. 
  
 
140 
Abbreviations 
AUD  Australian dollars 
CDC  Centre for Disease Control 
CrI  Credible interval 
ED  Emergency Department 
EDSSS Emergency Department Syndromic Surveillance System 
EH  Environmental Health 
FSANZ Food Standards Australia New Zealand 
ICD-10 International Statistical Classification of Disease 
ID  Identification 
INFOSAN International Food Safety Authorities Network  
NT  Northern Territory 
NTG  Northern Territory Government 
NTNDS Northern Territory Notifiable Disease Surveillance System 
OFN  OzFoodNet 
PPN  Predictive value negative 
PPV  Predictive value positive 
RDH  Royal Darwin Hospital 
US  United States 
 
  
 
141 
List of tables 
Table 1. Selection of commonly identified foodborne pathogens and their clinical 
courses.
8
 ............................................................................................................ 145 
Table 2. Estimated annual costs of foodborne illness in Australia.
9
 ............................. 146 
Table 3. Stakeholders involved in evaluation of the RDH EDSSS............................... 151 
Table 4. Outbreaks successfully detected by the RDH EDSSS .................................... 155 
Table 5. Sensitivity and PPV of the EDSSS when alert thresholds were altered (October 
2010 – May 2015) ............................................................................................. 159 
Table 6. Point source outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with restaurants or 
functions successfully detected by the RDH EDSSS ........................................ 161 
 
List of figures 
Figure 1. Example of daily RDH EDSSS gastroenteritis report emailed to OFN 
epidemiologist ................................................................................................... 152 
Figure 2. Flow diagram of RDH EDSSS ...................................................................... 153 
Figure 3. Distribution of the 3 day sum of adult gastroenteritis presentations to RDH ED 
and best fit poisson curve (October 2010 – May 2015) .................................... 154 
Figure 4. Alerts of RDH EDSSS and corresponding outbreaks (2010-2015) .............. 158 
Figure 5. Adult gastroenteritis presentations at RDH ED (October 2010 – May 2015), 
by day of the week ............................................................................................ 165 
 
  
 
142 
Abstract 
Introduction 
The Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) Emergency Department Syndromic Surveillance 
System (EDSSS) was established in 2010 and monitors presentations of people aged 14 
years and over to RDH with gastrointestinal symptoms. The aim of this system is to 
detect point source outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness associated with restaurants or 
functions. The EDSSS has not been evaluated since its inception. This report describes 
and evaluates the RDH EDSSS and makes recommendations for improvement. 
Methods 
An evaluation of the surveillance system was undertaken. The guidelines used for 
evaluating the system were both from the United States (US) Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention; the ‘Updated guidelines for evaluating public health 
surveillance systems’; and the ‘Framework for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance 
Systems for Early Detection of Outbreaks’. System attributes were investigated via 
interviews with stakeholders, document review and analysis of data in the EDSSS. For 
more in depth evaluation of the key attribute of sensitivity we compared EDSSS data 
against known outbreaks of gastroenteritis recorded in the OzFoodNet (OFN) outbreak 
register, and conducted a sensitivity analysis to determine the most appropriate 
threshold for the register to signal. 
Results 
The EDSSS triggered an alert 30 times between 1 October 2010 and 26
 
May 2015. 
During the same period there were 76 outbreaks registered in the OFN outbreak register. 
Of these 76 outbreaks, 9 were point source outbreaks associated with food businesses. 
On only 6 occasions did the EDSSS trigger in the 7 days following the earliest known 
onset of known outbreaks contained in the OFN outbreak register. The sensitivity of the 
EDSSS was 30% and the positive predictive value (PPV) was 10%. System alerts were 
not representative of all point source foodborne disease outbreaks but were 
representative of those whose aetiology manifests as serious disease. There was no 
documented standardised protocol to respond to system alerts or data 
transmission/quality issues.   
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Conclusion 
The EDSSS is a simple and inexpensive surveillance system that is accepted by its 
users. However the EDSSS is limited in its usefulness when compared against its stated 
aim. The system has a low sensitivity and is not useful for detecting point-source 
outbreaks of foodborne disease. It is however, very simple to run, inexpensive and 
accepted by its primary users. Recommendations have been made that should be 
considered in order to improve the usefulness of the EDSSS. 
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Introduction 
Public health importance of foodborne gastroenteritis 
Foodborne illness is caused by the presence of organisms and toxins in food and can 
result in symptoms such as diarrhoea, nausea, vomiting, fever, abdominal pain and even 
death. Foodborne illnesses can be caused by bacterial agents (including Salmonella, 
Shigella, Listeria, Campylobacter, diarrhoea caused by Escherichia coli), parasites 
(Entamoeba), viral agents (hepatitis A, hepatitis E, norovirus, rotavirus), bacterial toxins 
(Staphylococcus aureus toxin, Bacillus cereus toxin) or by toxins produced by algae 
(ciguatera fish poisoning).
1
  
The most commonly notified causes of foodborne illness in Australia are norovirus, 
pathogenic E. coli, Campylobacter and non-typhoidal Salmonella bacterium but it is 
estimated that 80% of sporadic illnesses are due to unknown cause.
2  
In the paragraphs 
below I outline why the surveillance of foodborne disease is important, and then discuss 
the legislative framework and methods of surveillance for foodborne disease.  
Potential severity of foodborne disease 
Although most foodborne illnesses only last a few days and are self-resolving, some 
cases can result in severe morbidity, requiring hospitalisation, and even death. It was 
estimated that in Australia circa 2010 there were 31,920 (90% Credible Interval (CrI): 
29,500-35,500) hospitalisations and 86 (90% Crl:70-105) deaths due to foodborne 
illness per year.
2
 In particular, foodborne disease caused by Listeria monocytogenes can 
have severe outcomes such as meningitis, septicaemia, spontaneous abortion, fetal death 
and death in adult cases.
3
 Similarly, infection with Shiga-toxin producing E. coli 
(STEC) can result in the life threatening condition, haemolytic uraemic syndrome 
(HUS). For example, a notable outbreak of HUS occurred in South Australia in 1995, 
and caused 23 cases in children, resulting in one death and ongoing severe health 
problems in five of the surviving cases.
4
 More recently, in 2013 an outbreak of 
salmonellosis linked to a restaurant in Canberra resulted in 162 cases of illness (80 
laboratory confirmed cases of S. Typhimurium 170) and 15 hospitalisations 
(OzFoodNet, unpublished data). This outbreak garnered wide media attention
5,6
 due to 
the large number of cases attending hospital emergency departments which resulted in 
the hospitals enacting their emergency response protocols.  
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Burden of disease and costs of foodborne gastroenteritis  
It was estimated that circa 2010, there were 4.1 million (90% Credible Interval (CrI): 
2.3–6.4 million) cases of foodborne gastroenteritis each year in Australia. This is 
approximately 25% (90% CrI: 13%–42%) of the 15.9 million episodes of gastroenteritis 
that occur annually in Australia.
2
 In 2005, a similar study estimated, using different 
methods, that the incidence of foodborne disease in Australia circa 2000 was 5.4 million 
(95% CrI 4.0–6.9 million) cases per year.7 Table 1 lists a selection of commonly 
identified foodborne pathogens and their typical clinical courses. 
Table 1. Selection of commonly identified foodborne pathogens and their clinical courses.
8
 
Agent Usual 
incubation 
period 
Symptoms Duration of 
illness 
Salmonella spp. 12-36 hours Diarrhoea (often bloody), abdominal 
pain, fever, nausea, vomiting 
2-5 days 
Shigella spp. 24-48 hours Watery diarrhoea (often bloody), 
abdominal pain, fever, vomiting 
4-7 days 
Campylobacter 
spp. 
2-5 days Acute diarrhoea, vomiting, fever, 
abdominal cramps 
2-5 days 
Norovirus 24-48 hours Sudden onset nausea, vomiting, 
diarrhoea, abdominal cramps, 
myalgia, low grade fever 
1-3 days 
Rotavirus 24-48 hours Vomiting, watery diarrhoea, 
malaise, headache, low grade fever 
4-8 days 
 
Foodborne disease is also costly to the community. Table 2 shows the annual economic 
cost of foodborne illness in 2006 which was estimated using the incidence of foodborne 
illness estimated circa 2000 and pricing estimates available at that time.
9
 The total 
estimated cost of $1,249 million Australian dollars (AUD) per year is significant and 
justifies the public health surveillance of foodborne disease. 
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Table 2. Estimated annual costs of foodborne illness in Australia.
9
 
Cost area Cost ($ million AUD) 
Individuals and business (all productivity and lifestyle) 771.6 
Individuals (premature mortality) 231.5 
Health care services 221.9 
Business (food safety recalls) 14 
Governments (foodborne illness surveillance and 
investigation, and maintaining food safety systems) 
 
10 
Total 1249 
 
Public expectation of safe food 
Foodborne illness attracts great public and political interest. Food is essential for life 
and so the whole population is exposed to the risk of foodborne illness independent of 
socioeconomic status, ethnicity, gender or subgroup. Australia is a developed country 
and the population expects to purchase and consume food that is safe to eat. Food 
Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) dictate what standards food has to adhere to 
in Australasia to be considered safe.
10 
Australia also has an international responsibility 
to ensure that it informs the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) 
if there is potential risk to other countries if unsafe food has been exported from 
Australia. When food is found to be unsafe, the Australian public expect that swift 
action and policy change will follow. An excellent example of the public and political 
interest in foodborne illness can be seen as a result of the recent outbreak of hepatitis A 
linked to imported frozen berries.
11
 There has been large public and political interest 
around what processes are in place to ensure the safety of imported food into 
Australia.
12
 There have been swift political calls for greater surveillance on imported 
foods to reduce the risk of foodborne disease. A recent senate estimates committee 
hearing resulted in calls to increase efforts to prevent contaminated food entering 
Australia and to move quickly to keep food safe.
13
 This is strong evidence of the public 
and political interest in foodborne disease and this contributes to its importance as a 
public health condition that needs to be under surveillance. 
Surveillance of foodborne disease 
Public health surveillance is the continuous, systematic collection, analysis and 
interpretation of health related data needed for the planning implementation, and 
evaluation of public health practice.
14
 
 
147 
Foodborne illness can be prevented by the safe manufacture, cultivation, production, 
transport, storage, processing and service of food. The surveillance of foodborne disease 
enables us to monitor trends in notifications or presentations, detect outbreaks, identify 
sources and prevent further transmission of disease. If surveillance of foodborne illness 
identifies increases in presentations then an investigation can be undertaken which may 
identify potential food sources or restaurants as sources of infection. Point source 
outbreaks of foodborne illness usually result in multiple individuals falling sick within a 
short time period and usually only hours or days after consuming contaminated food. 
This makes point source outbreaks of foodborne illness generally easier to investigate 
and measure than other disease outbreaks.
15
 
In the NT, outbreaks are usually detected by either increased numbers of laboratory 
confirmed conditions (e.g. salmonellosis) that are notified to the NT CDC
16
 or by 
reports from the public or clinicians.
17
 Environmental Health (EH) has the legislative 
authority to enforce the NT Food Act
18
 which incorporates the Australia New Zealand 
Food Standards Code.
10
 This code lists the requirements that food producers and 
businesses need to meet in order to maintain food safety in Australasia. In the NT, 
EHOs typically inspect premises and enforce the Food Act as a response to foodborne 
disease outbreak or cluster investigation undertaken by the NT CDC.   
The United States (US) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention advises that when 
assessing the importance of a health related event it is important to consider the course 
that the event could possibly take in the absence of an intervention.
14
 In the case of 
foodborne disease, the intervention is directed ultimately by the results of outbreak or 
cluster investigations, which usually involve removing unsafe food from distribution or 
sale (food recalls) or identifying and modifying unsafe food practices. The most 
effective intervention that public health surveillance activities can influence is change in 
policy. If interventions do not occur, the population may continue to be exposed and 
illness will continue or increase. Foodborne illness has real outbreak potential in the 
absence of an intervention as food may be distributed to wide geographical regions and 
a large number of people may be exposed. Outbreak potential is often cited as a 
justification for undertaking surveillance on a health condition.
14
  
In the NT and the rest of Australia, Indigenous Australians suffer from disease at a 
disproportionately higher rate than non-Indigenous Australians. In March 2008, the 
Commonwealth Government of Australia as well as all states and territories agreed to 
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reforms to ‘close the gap’ in Indigenous disadvantage.19 As a result, it is extremely 
important to be able to measure and ultimately reduce inequity and disparity in health 
outcomes between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. In the NT, Indigenous 
Australians suffer from higher rates of all notifiable enteric disease than non-Indigenous 
except for campylobacteriosis.
20
  
The use of syndromic surveillance for foodborne gastroenteritis 
Syndromic surveillance uses existing health data, including that which describes the 
frequency of illnesses with a specific set of clinical features, in real-time to provide 
immediate analysis and feedback to those charged with investigation and follow-up of 
potential outbreaks.
21
 The aim of syndromic surveillance is to identify disease clusters 
before diagnoses are confirmed via laboratory methods and reported to public health 
agencies, and to mobilize a rapid response.
21
 This can reduce morbidity and mortality.  
The majority of foodborne disease does not result in laboratory confirmed infections 
and subsequent notification to a public health unit. For example, in the NT in 2014 there 
were 909 notifications of foodborne or potentially foodborne disease with 54% of all 
notifications being salmonellosis (487 cases), 32% (294 cases) being 
campylobacteriosis and 11% (102 cases) being shigellosis.
20
 This number does not 
account for: 
 mild or asymptomatic infections 
 cases who did not present to a medical practitioner 
 cases who did not submit a sample for testing 
 cases who submitted a sample for testing but whose test result was negative. 
Syndromic surveillance for gastroenteritis has an ability to find additional cases of 
disease during known outbreaks and also alleviate concerns when outbreaks are 
occurring in other places.
22
 However, a major limitation of syndromic surveillance for 
gastroenteritis is the relatively low specificity due to the use of non-specific symptoms 
and a low positive predictive value (PPV).
22
 Although it provides an early warning 
system for potential foodborne disease outbreaks, it is still no substitute for clinicians 
reporting potential or perceived clusters of disease at the time of presentation.  
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The Emergency Department Syndromic Surveillance System (EDSSS) of 
gastroenteritis in the Northern Territory  
Traditional laboratory based surveillance for foodborne disease is likely to result in 
undercount, and due to the time taken for laboratory specimens to be processed, to lack 
timeliness. This is particularly the case in the NT where traditional laboratory based 
surveillance for foodborne disease outbreaks may not detect an outbreak until over a 
week after the onset of symptoms because most stool samples tested by private 
pathology laboratories are sent interstate for processing. Notifications of potential 
gastrointestinal outbreaks also come from medical officers and the public, however 
these rely on circumstances where clinicians see more than one ill person or where 
people who become unwell at a restaurant or function are then aware of others in the 
group also becoming unwell.   
In response to these known limitations, the Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) Emergency 
Department Syndromic Surveillance System (EDSSS) was established in 2010 and 
monitors presentations of people to RDH with gastrointestinal symptoms. When it was 
established, the stated aim of the RDH EDSSS was to identify point source outbreaks of 
gastrointestinal illness associated with restaurants or functions.
23
 The indicator chosen 
was the number of patients over 14 years of age who presented with diarrhoea or 
diarrhoea and vomiting to the RDH ED over a three day period. 
Purpose of evaluation 
The aim of this evaluation was to assess the ability of the RDH EDSSS against its stated 
aim, i.e. to detect point source outbreaks of foodborne gastroenteritis associated with 
restaurants or functions.  
Methods 
No ethics approval was sought. Evaluating an existing public health surveillance system 
is an essential role for any public health unit. The data analysed were collected under 
the auspices of the NT Notifiable Diseases Act,
24
 whereby medical practitioners are 
obliged to notify the Chief Health Officer (or delegate) on the diagnosis, or suspicion, 
of a notifiable disease.  
This evaluation was conducted using The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
Updated guidelines for evaluating surveillance systems
25
 and some aspects of the 
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Framework for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems for Early Detection of 
Outbreaks.
26 
The overall usefulness of the EDSSS was evaluated by its ability to detect outbreaks of 
foodborne disease in a timely fashion to enable appropriate public health actions to 
occur. This was done by determining how many known point source outbreaks of 
foodborne illness were detected within 7 days of the outbreak commencing, which 
enabled a public health response to be mounted within an acceptable time period. We 
defined the EDSSS as useful when it triggered an alert within 7 days of the onset of an 
outbreak recorded in the OFN register and this trigger resulted in public health action 
that would have occurred in lieu of the outbreak being detected by traditional 
surveillance. We considered 7 days a reasonable time in which an outbreak to be 
detected by traditional laboratory based surveillance. We also considered the system 
useful if it provided assurance that outbreaks of serious disease were NOT occurring. 
The sensitivity of the EDSSS was evaluated by is its ability to detect point-source 
outbreaks of foodborne illness associated with restaurants and functions. This was 
achieved by comparing retrospective EDSSS data with known outbreaks of foodborne 
disease recorded in the NT OFN Outbreak Register, and measuring the number of times 
the EDSSS signalled within 7 days following the earliest known onset date of known 
outbreaks contained in the OFN outbreak register. A sensitivity analysis was undertaken 
to determine if changing the alert threshold improved outbreak detection. 
The number and characteristics of the outbreaks that the EDSSS data had detected were 
also compared with those outbreaks in the OFN register.  
The simplicity of the system was evaluated by assessing the system’s procedural 
operation, human resources required for normal operation and responding to alerts, and 
the documentation underpinning the system’s operation and protocols. 
The timeliness of the system was evaluated by measuring time delays inherent in the 
EDSSS and assessing their effect on its overall usefulness when compared to its stated 
aim. This was done by assessing data transmission times and frequencies. 
Stability was evaluated via stakeholder consultation and by ascertaining the number of 
occasions when the EDSSS failed to transmit data. 
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Data quality was evaluated by assessing whether the current triage conditions were 
appropriate conditions to be notified to the EDSSS, the time at which this occurred and 
if the age of cases captured by the EDSSS was appropriate. This was done by 
comparing EDSSS data with age data of outbreak cases in the OFN outbreak register.  
Representativeness was evaluated by comparing the features of outbreaks that were 
successfully detected by the EDSSS with the information contained within the OFN 
outbreak register. 
Flexibility and portability were evaluated by assessing the ability of the system to adapt 
to changing needs and settings, specifically whether it was able to be used or modified 
by different users and used in different settings.  
The acceptability of the EDSSS was evaluated through informal discussion with the 3 
key stakeholders of the surveillance system. Cost effectiveness was also assessed via 
these discussions. 
Data from 1 October 2010 to 26 May 2015 were extracted from the NT OFN Outbreak 
Register (Microsoft
®
 Access database). This included information describing the 
symptomology, characteristics and numbers of cases as well as information on 
aetiology.  EDSSS data were extracted from Business Objects and contained daily 
counts of adult gastroenteritis presentations at RDH. Data were analysed using 
Microsoft
®
 Excel. 
Stakeholder consultation 
There are only 3 regular stakeholders, including myself, who interact with the system on 
a daily basis and possess a functional understanding of its process and purpose (Table 
3). I consulted with the other 2 stakeholders by phone and email throughout the 
evaluation. As the OFN epidemiologist I am also a key stakeholder and my knowledge 
of the system informed this evaluation.   
Table 3. Stakeholders involved in evaluation of the RDH EDSSS. 
Stakeholder Role in RDH EDSSS 
Head of RDH ED ED data custodian 
Head of surveillance at NT CDC Receives and analyses EDSSS data 
Writer of reports in Business Objects 
NT OzFoodNet (OFN) epidemiologist Receives and analyses EDSSS data  
This position informed the evaluation 
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Stakeholders were invited to contribute views and opinions to be incorporated into the 
evaluation. 
Performance of the surveillance system 
Operation of the RDH EDSSS 
The EDSSS operates as follows:  
When a patient presents at ED their complaint is entered into the CareSys hospital 
information system as a pre-coded complaint by a triage nurse (CareSys is a hospital 
information system designed for patient care and clinical management and used in the 
NT hospital system). There are two coded complaints which are counted within the 
EDSSS; DIAR (diarrhoea) and D+V (diarrhoea and vomiting). Additionally, the EDSSS 
only captures presentations for people over 14 years of age. This is in order to exclude 
the common person-to-person viral gastrointestinal illnesses associated with childhood, 
especially rotavirus. The number of presentations of adults with either DIAR or D+V 
are uploaded nightly to data warehouse external to the hospital system, where it is then 
downloaded the following day to Business Objects; a program at CDC that allows users 
to generate reports on the data that is stored in the data warehouse. A daily automated 
report is run in Business Objects that shows the number of daily adult gastrointestinal 
presentations and the rolling 3 day sum of these presentations and this is emailed to the 
OFN epidemiologist every day (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Example of daily RDH EDSSS gastroenteritis report emailed to OFN 
epidemiologist. 
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When the 3 day sum exceeds 10, an alert is triggered and a public health response 
follows. This usually entails contacting the head of the RDH ED, alerting them to the 
increase in presentations and asking clinicians to report to CDC cases that they perceive 
are associated with food businesses. This Business Objects report is monitored daily by 
the OFN epidemiologist who analyses the output of the report and compares this with 
notifications of enteric disease to the Northern Territory Notifiable Disease Surveillance 
System (NTNDS). The process and flow of data is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Flow diagram of RDH EDSSS. 
 
Operation of the RDH EDSSS – what triggers an alert? 
The signal threshold (alert trigger) of a 3 day sum of 11 or more was established prior to 
the system’s implementation in 2010 by analysing 6 months of retrospective ED data 
and using the mean (µ=5.1) plus 2 standard deviations (σ=2.3) to establish the threshold 
of >10. Over the period of October 1
st
 2010 to May 26
th
 2015, the median 3 day sum of 
adult gastro presentations was 4, with a mean of 4.6 and σ=2.1. The distribution of the 3 
day sum of adult gastroenteritis presentations is shown below in figure 2. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the 3 day sum of adult gastroenteritis presentations to RDH ED 
and best fit Poisson curve (October 2010 – May 2015). 
 
Evaluation of usefulness 
A public health surveillance system is useful if it contributes to the prevention and 
control of adverse health-related events, including an improved understanding of the 
public health implications of such events.
25
 We defined the EDSSS as useful when it 
triggered an alert within 7 days of the onset of an outbreak recorded in the OFN register 
and this trigger resulted in public health action that would have occurred in lieu of the 
outbreak being detected by traditional surveillance. We considered 7 days a reasonable 
time in which an outbreak to be detected by traditional laboratory based surveillance. 
We also considered the system useful if it provided assurance that outbreaks of serious 
disease were NOT occurring. 
Overall, the EDSSS triggered 30 times between October 1
st
 2010 and May 26
th
 2015. 
On only 6 occasions did the EDSSS trigger in the 7 days following the earliest known 
onset dates of known outbreaks contained in the OFN outbreak register. Table 4 
outlines the key features of the 6 outbreaks detected by the EDSSS within 7 days of the 
earliest known onset date of a known outbreak. 
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Table 4. Outbreaks successfully detected by the RDH EDSSS. 
Outbreak ID 
(as recorded 
in NT OFN 
Outbreak 
Register) 
Month & 
year of 
outbreak 
Pathogen Number 
of people 
affected 
Number of 
people 
hospitalised 
Setting of 
outbreak 
DAR0212 Jan 2012 Norovirus 6 0 Private 
residence 
DAR0413 Feb 2013 Unknown 6 0 Private 
residence 
DAR0513 May 2013 Rotavirus 49 1 Community 
DAR0613 May 2013 Salmonella 
Typhimurium 108 5 1 Market stall 
DAR0314 Apr 2014 Salmonella 
Typhimurium 9 9 3 Restaurant 
DAR0514 Apr 2014 Salmonella 
Typhimurium 9 5 0 Restaurant 
 
The system detected only 3 known outbreaks of suspected foodborne disease associated 
with restaurants or functions. The EDSSS was therefore not useful in detecting 
outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with food premises. However, it does appear 
to be useful in providing reassurance that large or severe outbreaks are in fact not 
occurring. This indicates that the system lacked sensitivity (see ‘Sensitivity’ section 
below). 
Simplicity 
Simplicity refers to both the structure and the ease of operation of the surveillance 
system. Surveillance systems should be as simple as possible while still meeting their 
objectives.
25 
The EDSSS is a very simple system and runs at minimal cost. It is a passive 
surveillance system with cases notified from routine data collected by nurses in ED at 
triage. Data are automatically uploaded to the NT government data warehouse and a 
daily report, including cumulative numbers of adult gastroenteritis presentations is 
automatically emailed to both the OFN epidemiologist and CDC head of surveillance 
for daily review.  
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The establishment of this surveillance process was also relatively simple but brief 
training in Business Objects software is required in order to set-up or modify the 
automatic report that is emailed daily. A user can be trained in a few hours and once 
familiar with its use, reports can be modified in minutes. Currently, surveillance staff 
(typically, between 3-6 persons) are the only regular users of Business Objects at CDC. 
Users can interpret the outputs of EDSSS with minimal training. 
However, simplicity is lost when the EDSSS actually signals. There is no documented 
standard procedure when an alert is triggered and no guidance as to what a standard 
public health response should include. There are ad hoc procedures that are currently 
followed when responding to an alert. Either a request for identified ED presentation 
data is requested from the head of the RDH ED in order to follow up individual 
presentations or the ED presentation data are trawled for cases with discharge diagnoses 
that indicate infective gastroenteritis. The first option often results in a time-delay and 
the second option is not a simple straightforward procedure as it requires each patient 
episode to be opened one-by-one. The simplicity of the EDSSS could be improved by 
introducing a standardised response protocol to follow when an alert signals. 
Currently there is a record of the number of times the EDSSS triggered but there is no 
accurate record of when or if public health responses followed these alerts. Currently, 
clusters and outbreaks of foodborne disease that are investigated in the NT are given an 
outbreak identification (ID) number and entered into the OFN Outbreak Register 
whether an aetiology is known or not. As part of a standardised response protocol, each 
response to an EDSSS signal could be registered as a cluster and given an outbreak ID 
with the prefix ‘RDH’. This would further increase the simplicity of the system by 
enabling users to not only be able to follow a standard response protocol but also be 
able to easily find and review each response. 
Recommendations: 
The EDSSS is a relatively simple surveillance system however its simplicity could be 
improved by formulating a standardised response protocol for when the system triggers. 
A response to the EDSSS is technically a cluster or outbreak investigation and it is 
recommended that as well as following a standard follow-up protocol, each time the 
EDSSS triggers an outbreak ID should be generated. 
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Sensitivity and predictive value positive 
Sensitivity can be considered at 2 levels. The first level is that of case reporting, i.e. the 
proportion of cases detected. The second level is the sensitivity of the surveillance 
system to detect outbreaks.
25
 
A meaningful value for the sensitivity of detecting individual case reports reported to 
the EDSSS is difficult to establish. The presentations of people aged over 14 years who 
present to RDH ED with complaints that are coded as either Diarrhoea (DIAR) or 
Vomiting/diarrhoea (V+D) are reported to the EDSSS. This is likely to be highly 
sensitive as there are a myriad of non-enteric diseases that could manifest with these 2 
symptoms as presenting complaints. In another respect it could be said that the system 
lacks sensitivity as it only detects people who seek health care at a hospital emergency 
department. Such presentations are estimated to make up less than 1% of all 
gastroenteritis cases each year.
2
 
The EDSSS triggered 30 times between October 1st 2010 and May 26th 2015. In the 
same time period, there were 76 gastroenteritis outbreaks registered in the OFN NT 
Outbreak Register with 24 of those being suspected foodborne outbreaks and only 9 of 
these being from restaurants or functions. 
The OFN Outbreak Register is not a complete source of enteric disease outbreaks in the 
NT but does represent those that are known and recorded. It is not a perfect benchmark 
for known gastroenteritis outbreaks and this limitation should be noted. For the purpose 
of this evaluation, a ‘successful’ trigger of the EDSSS occurred when it signalled within 
7 days of the earliest onset date of a known outbreak of suspected foodborne disease 
associated with a restaurant or function. Only 6 known outbreaks of enteric disease 
occurred in the 7 days prior to the occasions when the EDSSS triggered with a 3 day 
sum of >10 presentations. Of these 6 known outbreaks, only 4 were suspected 
foodborne and only 3 were associated with eating from restaurants or functions; 2 
restaurants and 1 market stall. This is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Alerts of RDH EDSSS and corresponding outbreaks (2010-2015). 
 
The fewest number of people affected in outbreaks that were both detected by the 
EDSSS and entered in the OFN register was 5 (see Table 4). All 3 foodborne outbreaks 
detected by the EDSSS were due to Salmonella and all 3 of these outbreaks had at least 
one person present to the ED. The EDSSS therefore has a sensitivity of no more than 
33% for detecting true outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with restaurants or 
functions. The sensitivity is in fact likely to be less than 33% because the number of 
total known outbreaks which occurred is likely to be more than the 9 captured in the 
OFN outbreak register. i.e. we will never know how many outbreaks actually occurred.  
The sensitivity of a surveillance system to detect outbreaks is linked to the predictive 
value positive (PPV) and predictive value negative (PPN).
26
  
The PPV is the proportion of detected cases that actually have the health related event 
under surveillance.
25
 In this instance the PPV is the probability that when the EDSSS 
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signals it is actually due to an outbreak of foodborne disease from a restaurant or 
function. The PPV of the EDSSS was calculated to be 10% (3 true outbreaks detected 
out of 30 signals) which reflects its poor ability to accurately detect outbreaks of 
foodborne disease associated with food premises. 
Sensitivity analysis 
The threshold for the EDSSS signalling was altered to see whether this would have any 
effect on the sensitivity of the system to detect outbreaks of foodborne disease 
associated with restaurants or functions. The results of this sensitivity analysis are in 
Table 5. 
Table 5. Sensitivity and PPV of the EDSSS when alert thresholds were altered (October 
2010 – May 2015). 
 Threshold  
>10 cases in 3 days 
(current) 
Threshold 
>9 cases in 3 
days 
Threshold 
>8 cases in 3 
days 
No. of times EDSSS signalled 30 55 109 
No. of point source foodborne 
outbreaks detected by EDSSS 3 3 3 
No. of point source foodborne 
outbreaks in OFN outbreak 
register 9 9 9 
Sensitivity  33% 33% 33% 
PPV 10% 5% 3% 
 
Altering the threshold of numbers of cases did not improve the sensitivity and the PPV 
decreased. 
On the 3 occasions that the EDSSS signalled and accurately predicted a point source 
outbreak associated with a food premise, the 3 day sum of presentations to RDH ED 
was >9 in the 2 days prior to the signal (i.e. the 3 day sum was >9 for 3 consecutive 
days).  
The sensitivity of the system is low as is the likelihood that when the system triggers it 
actually represents an outbreak. With the current threshold of >10 presentations in 3 
days the PPV was only 10% meaning that 90% of the time, the alert is a false one. With 
limited resources and time it is imperative that the EDSSS has an increased PPV which 
could be achieved by having a second alert signal when >9 adult presentations in 3 days 
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occurs on 3 consecutive days. Ultimately though, there needs to be a balance between 
specificity and sensitivity and the current threshold best achieves this. The PVP and 
sensitivity are most likely low because most cases of gastroenteritis presenting to ED 
are sporadic. 
Recommendation: 
The current threshold of  >10 adult presentations of gastrointestinal illness in 3 days 
should remain as the trigger for an alert to public health staff at CDC that there may 
be a possible outbreak of foodborne illness in the community. The public health 
response to this trigger should be an outbreak investigation and an alert to ED 
clinicians to report any perceived clusters amongst presenting patients or any 
perceived connections to food outlets or restaurants. 
A second alert should be triggered when >9 adult presentations of gastrointestinal 
illness in 3 days, occurs on 3 consecutive days. This signal should result in a 
standard outbreak investigation.  
 
Timeliness 
Timeliness reflects the speed between steps in a public health surveillance system.
25
  
There are multiple steps in the operation of the EDSSS (Figure 1) and each step 
introduces a delay in the system’s ability to detect anything that requires a public health 
response. Delays in the process occur due to the following: 
 the incubation period (consumption of food to onset of symptoms). 
 the time between the onset of symptoms to presentation at RDH ED (this 
depends on the clinical characteristics of each disease and of the individual). 
 the delay between the input of the presenting complaint at RDH ED and the 
transmission of this data to the government data warehouse (ED data is uploaded 
to the warehouse at 06:00 hours each morning).  
 the delay between transmission of data to the government data warehouse from 
ED and the generation of a Business Objects report that includes counts and an 
alert (if threshold triggered). This occurs at 09:00 hours the same day. The report 
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and data transmitted are therefore not real time data but data from the previous 
day. 
 the delay that occurs when examining this report and confirming an outbreak. 
The OFN epidemiologist at NT CDC needs to seek authorisation from the 
EDSSS data custodian (head of RDH ED) to access the hospital records and 
search for individual patients at RDH ED who were diagnosed with 
gastrointestinal illness over the trigger period and administer questionnaires to 
them. From the time of patient presentation, it would take a minimum of 1 
working day to determine the existence of an outbreak.  
There is no data transmission from the RDH ED to the government data warehouse on 
Saturday, Sunday or Monday mornings. This can add an additional 2 day delay to the 
detection of an outbreak of foodborne illness by the EDSSS.  
The shortest possible time between an exposure to contaminated food from a restaurant 
or function and the EDSSS signalling due to an outbreak would be 72 hours. For this to 
occur, the illness would need to have a relatively short incubation period (i.e. toxin 
mediated illness, norovirus infection, salmonellosis), cases would need to present to 
hospital early in their illness, there would need to be a sufficiently large number of 
people presenting on a single day in order to trigger the threshold of >10 adult 
presentations in 3 days and there would need to be no unforeseen delays in the 
transmission of data and from the government data warehouse (i.e. not a weekend).  
Most likely, it would probably take 4-7 days for the EDSSS to signal after an exposure 
to contaminated food from a restaurant or function. Table 6 shows that the EDSSS is 
timely enough to detect point source outbreaks of foodborne disease in the NT before 
traditional laboratory surveillance. This probably has more to do with the long 
processing times associated with the private pathology laboratories in the NT who send 
all faecal samples interstate for testing.   
Table 6. Point source outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with restaurants or 
functions successfully detected by the RDH EDSSS. 
Outbreak ID (as 
recorded in NT OFN 
Outbreak Register) 
Date outbreak detected 
by laboratory based 
surveillance and routine 
questionnaires 
Date outbreak 
detected by 
EDSSS 
EDSSS detected 
outbreak before or 
after traditional 
surveillance? 
DAR0613 27/05/2013 22/05/2013 Before (by 2 days) 
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DAR0314 29/04/2014 21/04/2014 Before (by 8 days) 
DAR0514 02/05/2014 21/04/2014 Before (by 11 days) 
 
Although the EDSSS is effective in detecting outbreaks of foodborne disease earlier 
than traditional laboratory methods, its timeliness could be improved by being able to 
analyse ED data in real time. Currently this is not possible with the information 
management systems used in the NT. 
Recommendations: 
The timeliness of the EDSSS could be improved if up-to-date ED presentation data 
were transmitted to the government data warehouse daily rather than the current practice 
whereby the most current data transmitted is from presentations 2 days previously. 
Ultimately, if a department-wide single information management system were 
introduced in the future, real-time access to examine emergency department 
presentations would potentially increase the timeliness of the EDSSS. 
 
Stability 
Stability of the system refers to the ability (i.e. the ability to collect, manage and 
provide data properly without failure) and availability (the ability to be operational 
when it is needed) of the public health surveillance system.
25
 
While there is no record of the number of times when the EDSSS failed to provide 
meaningful data, from my own observation and that of other stakeholders this is a fairly 
regular occurrence.  
One regular factor that leads to a lack of stability is the fact that ED data is not 
transmitted to the data warehouse on weekends. This means that the EDSSS reports that 
are emailed on Saturdays, Sundays and Mondays do not contain complete data and are 
not meaningful, but reports generated on Tuesday, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays 
will contain the previous weekend’s counts and represent complete data. Monday is the 
day the report will lack the most data as it will not contain ED data from at least 2 days. 
When data fails to transmit, the head of surveillance at CDC liaises with NT 
government information management systems managers. There is however no 
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automatic report or warning if data do not transmit. Data are usually transmitted the 
following day after a fault has been reported. 
Recommendations: 
An alert should appear on the EDSSS report when the count on the EDSSS report of 
total presentations to RDH ED is <100, which is an indication that data may not have 
been transmitted. When this occurs the standard response should be an email from the 
OFN epidemiologist or the CDC head of surveillance that the data may have failed to 
transmit. This alert being triggered will also enable dates when data fails to be 
transmitted to be recorded.  
 
Data quality 
Data quality reflects the completeness and validity of the data recorded in the public 
health surveillance system.
25
 
Cases are counted in the EDSSS if they present to the RDH ED and their coded 
presenting complaint is related to gastrointestinal illness; DIAR (diarrhoea) and D+V 
(diarrhoea and vomiting). A complete list of presenting complaints and their triage 
codes can be found in appendix 1. The two codes selected for the EDSSS are the only 2 
that relate primarily to gastrointestinal illness. Another option would be using ICD 
(International Statistical Classification of Disease)-10 codes,
27
 which are assigned to 
patients on discharge from ED (including discharge to an ‘admitted patient’ status 
within the hospital). However this would not be suitable as the number of ICD-10 codes 
that could relate to gastrointestinal illness is far too great. In addition, the fact that these 
diagnostic codes are assigned at discharge rather than at presentation and may introduce 
a further time delay into what is intended to be an early detection system. Counting 
cases of diarrhoea or vomiting/diarrhoea is simple, unambiguous and the most 
appropriate option for the EDSSS. 
Additionally, the EDSSS only includes gastrointestinal presentations for people over 14 
years of age. This is in order to exclude the common person-to-person viral 
gastrointestinal illnesses associated with childhood. The OFN outbreak register contains 
9 known point source outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with restaurants or 
functions between October 2010 and May 2015. Of the total of 86 known ill people 
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associated with those 9 outbreaks, only one child was less than 10 years of age. 
However, 31 of those 86 were aged between 10 and 14 years of age with 30 being ill 
from one salmonellosis outbreak associated with drinking cordial on a school camp. 
Although none of these children presented to the hospital, it is evidence that children of 
that age can be involved in point source outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with 
restaurants or functions. Children between 10-14 years of age should be therefore 
included in the population under surveillance. 
Recommendation: 
Consider changing the age of cases under surveillance from >14 years of age to ≥10 
years of age. 
ED data should be transmitted to the NT government data warehouse daily. 
 
Representativeness 
A system that is representative accurately describes the occurrence of a health related 
event over time and its distribution in the population by place and person.
25
 The EDSSS 
was evaluated to determine what type of outbreaks it was effective at detecting in terms 
of size and aetiology, the symptomology of individuals, and whether it was more 
effective at detecting outbreaks depending on the day of week people presented to RDH 
ED.  
The EDSSS had a poor ability to detect outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with 
restaurants or functions and in this respect it isn’t representative of what is occurring in 
the population when an outbreak occurs. However, the EDSSS was representative when 
there were not outbreaks occurring, which is particularly useful during times of 
heightened risk, increased rumours in the media or increased background notifications 
of disease by traditional methods.
26
    
There didn’t appear to be any great variation in the number of adults presenting to RDH 
ED with diarrhoeal illness on different days of the week (see figure 3). There does not 
seem to be any ‘weekend effect’ which was hypothesised prior to the evaluation of the 
surveillance system (Figure 5). Unfortunately, it was impossible to determine the 
individual onset dates of people who were notified to the EDSSS and this individual 
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onset date information was not contained within the OFN NT outbreak register, only the 
earliest onset date of the outbreak as a whole. 
There is also the possibility that the system is not representative of the entire Darwin 
population in that persons presenting to ED are probably more likely to be those that are 
from lower socioeconomic groups and cannot afford to attend a non-bulk billing 
medical practice or may live in close proximity to RDH. There is no way of determining 
this using data from the EDSSS.  
 
Figure 5. Adult gastroenteritis presentations at RDH ED (October 2010 – May 2015), by 
day of the week. 
Of the 3 point source, suspected outbreaks of foodborne disease from restaurants or 
functions that the EDSSS was successfully able to detect, all were due to Salmonella 
Typhimurium (STm) with 2 outbreaks due to STm 9 and 1 outbreak due to STm 108. 
The minimum number of people affected by these outbreaks was 5 persons and each of 
these outbreaks resulted in 3 people presenting to the RDH ED. These outbreaks all 
included persons suffering from symptoms that included bloody diarrhoea, abdominal 
pain and fever which could be considered to be more serious symptoms compared to 
standard diarrhoea, nausea or vomiting.  
Therefore, the EDSSS is not representative of all outbreaks of foodborne disease. It is 
more likely to detect outbreaks that have at least 3 people presenting to hospital and it is 
more likely to detect those outbreaks whose aetiology manifests in more serious 
symptoms such as fever, bloody diarrhoea and abdominal pain. This is important 
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because these are the types of outbreaks that a busy public health unit should be 
investigating, rather than outbreaks of non-severe disease. 
Flexibility 
A flexible public health surveillance system can adapt to changing information needs or 
operating conditions with little additional time, personnel or allocated funds.
25
 
The EDSSS for adult gastroenteritis presentations at RDH ED is highly automated with 
respect to data collection, data transmission and report generation. It is however very 
easy to rapidly modify data reports to reflect changed needs such as when a threshold 
alert needs to be modified or when other syndromes need to be added to those currently 
under surveillance. This can occur in a matter of minutes, at no cost and by staff already 
employed at the NT CDC with access to the Business Objects software. An email of the 
EDSSS daily report can be sent to any email address and recipients can be modified as 
required. 
The heavy reliance on automation results in less flexibility of the system especially in 
terms of being able to increase the frequency of data transmission, as may be required 
during periods of heightened risk. As discussed above there is also currently an inability 
to transmit data from ED to the NT government data warehouse over weekends as 
transmission is usually disabled in order for hospital information management systems 
to undergo essential weekly maintenance. Ideally, the EDSSS should be flexible enough 
to enable transmission over weekends when there are periods of heightened risk such as 
events like World Youth Day, music festivals or sporting competitions that bring large 
numbers of people together.  
 
Portability 
Portability refers to how well a surveillance system could be duplicated in another 
setting.
26
 
Recommendation: 
Staff from CDC should liaise with NT government data warehouse managers to develop 
an ability to transmit data to the NT government data warehouse more regularly during 
periods of heightened risk, including weekends.  
 
167 
The EDSSS for adult gastroenteritis at RDH ED is a simple surveillance system 
whereby cases are counted based on their presenting complaint, data is automatically 
transmitted to the NT government data warehouse and then an automatically generated 
report is emailed to surveillance staff daily. 
This inherent simplicity means that the EDSSS at RDH can be easily duplicated to 
conduct surveillance of other syndromes at RDH or at other hospitals around the NT as 
all hospital sites in the NT transmit data to the same NTG data warehouse. Reports can 
easily be modified depending on syndrome and location and then automatically emailed 
to a nominated recipient.  
In a setting outside of the NT hospital system, the same basic principles can be 
employed to duplicate the system but the level of automation will vary depending on the 
setting, coding used to classify patient presentations and appropriate alert thresholds 
would need to be established. In low resource or remote settings, simple software 
packages can facilitate the basic data input and analysis required by the system but more 
human interaction would be required. 
One major issue detracting from the portability of the system is that there is no formal 
document outlining the principles and operation of the system. There is also no 
documented standard procedure to follow when an alert is triggered and no guidance as 
to what a standard public health response should entail. The system could be adapted to 
use in NT remote health clinics but it is likely that clinic staff would be aware of an 
increase before a syndromic surveillance system triggered. 
Recommendations: 
The principles and operation of the EDSSS should be formalised, documented and 
freely available to stakeholders that use the system.  
A standard response protocol should be developed for use when the EDSSS signals. 
 
Acceptability 
Acceptability reflects the willingness of persons and organisations to participate in the 
surveillance system.
25
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The EDSSS was well accepted by all stakeholders with none reporting any complaints 
or grievances. The key to the high level of acceptability is the minimal extra work that 
the EDSSS imposes on staff at CDC who receive the daily reports and on the staff at 
RDH ED who are the custodians of the data.  
The head of RDH ED reported no complaints or negative responses when asked of the 
ED staff’s participation in the surveillance system. No extra work is generated for ED 
staff as the data is routinely collected and entered at the triage stage. On the occasions 
that the EDSSS signalled, the head of ED always confirmed with CDC that this was 
communicated to clinical staff and CDC were always given authorisation to access ED 
data and investigate the signals. 
Similarly, CDC staff were accepting of the system, primarily because it did not place a 
large demand on staff to monitor the daily emails and respond to signals. The EDSSS 
did not signal a sufficiently large number of times to place unacceptable demands on the 
staff at CDC. 
Recommendations: 
The EDSSS will continue to be well accepted by stakeholders if the demands on staff 
time remain minimal. Any modifications to the EDSSS must take this into 
consideration. 
 
Cost 
Cost is a vital factor when assessing the relative value of syndromic surveillance 
systems.
26 
The EDSSS is an efficient system.  
The cost of maintaining the EDSSS is minimal as it is heavily automatic and relies on 
the collection of information that is already routinely collected as part of patient 
management. There is no cost involved in maintaining this automatic system which 
makes use of existing software. Additionally, no extra funding was required to establish 
it. 
The system only triggered 30 times over the 4.5 year period that this evaluation 
reviewed. There is minimal additional burden placed on staff at CDC to investigate 
signals when the system only triggers twice per year and reviewing a daily report which 
 
169 
does not contain a signal takes less than a minute. Outbreaks or suspected outbreaks of 
gastrointestinal disease are routinely investigated by the NT OFN epidemiologist and 
the head of surveillance at NT CDC. The cost of an investigating an outbreak is quite 
separate from the actual running of the EDSSS.  
Recommendations: 
The EDSSS is inexpensive in terms of financial cost and demands on staff time. 
This efficiency can be maintained and increased by developing a standard protocol to 
respond to signals and by ensuring that appropriate signal thresholds are employed to 
minimise unnecessary investigations. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Evaluating surveillance systems is important to ensure that the systems are effectively 
and efficiently monitoring conditions of public health importance. This report evaluated 
the syndromic surveillance of adult gastroenteritis presentations at RDH ED. Although 
the system is not sensitive and only detected 30% of point-source outbreaks, those 
outbreaks were more likely to cause severe disease. A strength of the system is therefore 
its usefulness as a means of reassurance that outbreaks of severe foodborne disease such 
as those caused by Salmonella are not occurring. This is particularly useful when 
outbreaks of disease are occurring in other jurisdictions, when contaminated food or 
drink are known to be in the public domain (i.e. during a food recall) or when there is 
heightened risk or a perceived heightened risk of foodborne illness from a particular 
food business. 
The aim of the RDH EDSSS, which is to detect point source outbreaks of foodborne 
illness associated with food premises is highly specific but is also entirely appropriate. 
Detecting and investigating these types of outbreaks can potentially have far reaching 
effects on food safety policy. The principles of the RDH EDSSS could be applied to 
conduct surveillance of gastroenteritis at other sites in the NT and indeed other diseases.  
A major limitation of this evaluation is from the use of the OFN NT outbreak register as 
the ‘gold standard’ for comparing the EDSSS signals against, in order to assess the 
sensitivity of the system to detect outbreaks of point source gastroenteritis in the NT. It 
is not a perfect source of outbreak information and only represents those outbreaks that 
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were actually detected by traditional surveillance means. It does not take into account 
outbreaks that were not detected or that were investigated by other sources. Other 
limitations include the lack of stakeholders involved with the system and my own 
position as a stakeholder, which may have influenced my opinions. A large part of my 
acceptance of the system is due to its simplicity, minimal demands required and its low 
cost. On the other hand, my own placement and understanding of the system’s functions 
could be considered one of the strengths of this evaluation. 
The surveillance system is well accepted by users as it places minimal demands on staff 
resources and incurs a negligible financial cost due to its reliance on data management 
processes and software that are already in use. The recommendations of this report 
should be considered in order to improve the usefulness of this system to detect point-
source outbreaks of foodborne disease associated with restaurants and functions.   
Summary of recommendations 
This evaluation recommends the following: 
1. The operation of the EDSSS should be formalised, documented and freely available 
to stakeholders that use the system.  
2. A response to the EDSSS is a cluster or outbreak investigation and it is recommended 
that a standard response protocol be developed and documented. 
3. Any response to an EDSSS signal should result in an outbreak ID being generated 
and the response entered in the OFN outbreak register. 
4. The current threshold of  >10 adult presentations of gastrointestinal illness in 3 days 
should  remain as the trigger for an alert to public health staff at CDC that there may be 
a possible outbreak of foodborne illness in the community. The public health response 
to this trigger should be an outbreak/cluster investigation and an alert to ED clinicians 
to report any perceived clusters amongst presenting patients or any perceived 
connections to food outlets or restaurants. 
5. A second threshold should be established when >9 adult presentations in 3 days 
occurs on 3 consecutive days, and should result in a standard cluster/outbreak 
investigation. 
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6. ED data should be transmitted to the NT government data warehouse nightly or 
ideally, in real-time. There should be an ability to transmit data to the NT government 
data warehouse more regularly during periods of heightened risk, including weekends. 
Real-time access to emergency department data would be desirable if a single 
department-wide information management system is introduced by the NT Department 
of Health in the future. 
7. An alert should appear on the EDSSS report when the count on the EDSSS report of 
total presentations to RDH ED is <100, which is an indication that data may not have 
been transmitted. When this occurs the standard response should be an email from the 
OFN epidemiologist or the CDC head of surveillance to the NT government data 
warehouse alerting that the data may have failed to transmit. This alert will also enable 
recording of incidents when data transmission fails. 
8. Consider changing the age of cases under surveillance from >14 years of age to ≥10 
years of age. 
9. The EDSSS will continue to be well accepted by stakeholders if the demands on staff 
time remain minimal. Any modifications to the EDSSS must take this into 
consideration. 
 
  
 
172 
References 
1. Foodborne Intoxications. In: Heymann, DL, editor. Control of Communicable 
Diseases. 20th Ed. Washington : American Public Health Association; 2015. 
2. Kirk M, Ford L, Glass K, Hall G. Foodborne illness, Australia, circa 2000 and circa 
2010. Emerg Infect Dis. 2014; 20(11). 
3. Listeriosis. In: Heymann, DL, editor. Control of Communicable Diseases. 20th Ed. 
Washington : American Public Health Association; 2015. 
4. Henning PH, Tham E, Martin A, et al. Haemolytic-uraemic syndrome outreak caused 
by Eschericia coli O111:H-: clinical outcomes. Med J Aust. 1998; 168(11): 552-555. 
5. Page F. Good Food - Hospitals battle to cope with food poisoning. Fairfax Media 
2013; 16 Jun. [cited 01 April 2015] Available from: http://www.goodfood.com.au/good-
food/food-news/hospitals-battle-to-cope-with-poisoning-20130516-2jnle.html  
6. ABC News. Food poisoning probe continues as eater reopens. Australian 
Broadcasting Commission 2013; 21 May. [cited 01 April 2015] Available from: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-21/food-poisoning-probe-continues-as-eatery-
reopens/4702244  
7. Hall G, Kirk MD, Becker N et al. Estimating foodborne gastroenteritis, Australia. 
Emerg Infect Dis. 2005; 11(8): 1257-1264. 
8. Queensland Government Department of Health. Foodborne pathogens compendium 
for outbreak investigations - 2010. Queensland Government Department of Health, 
2010. [cited 02 April 2015] Available from: 
http://www.health.qld.gov.au/ph/documents/cdb/30586.pdf   
9. Abelson P, Potter Forbes M, Hall, G. The Annual cost of foodborne illness in 
Australia. Canberra: Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing, 2006. 
[cited 02 April 2015] Available from: 
http://www.ozfoodnet.gov.au/internet/ozfoodnet/publishing.nsf/content/137D93E76546
8F17CA2572130080B157/$File/cost-foodborne.pdf   
10. Food Standards Australia New Zealand. Australia New Zealand Food Standards 
Code. Canberra: Food Standards Australia New Zealand, 2008. Available from: 
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/code/Pages/default.aspx   
11. Australian Government Department of Health. Hepatitis A and frozen berries recall. 
Canberra: Australian Government Department of Health, 2015. [cited 02 April 2015] 
Available from: http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-
hep-A-frozen-berry.htm   
12. Sydney Morning Herald. Berries under no greater surveillance following hepatitis A 
outbreak.Fairfax Media 2015; 23 Feb. [cited 02 April 2015] Available from: 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/berries-under-no-greater-
surveillance-following-hepatitis-a-outbreak-20150223-13m82u.html 
13. Medhora, Shalailah. Imported frozen berries given no extra surveillance since 
hepatitis A outbreak. The Guardian 2015: 23 Feb. [cited 02 April 2015] Available from: 
 
173 
http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/feb/23/imported-frozen-berries-no-
extra-surveillance-hepatitis-a-outbreak   
14. World Health Organisation (WHO). Public Health Surveillance; 2016. Available 
from: http://www.who.int/topics/public_health_surveillance/en/ 
15. Christian JHB, Cole MB, Tomaska L. Food Safety and Testing in Perspective. In 
Hocking ED, editor. Foodborne Microorganisms of Public Health Significance. 6th Ed. 
Waterloo: Southwood Press Pty Limited; 2003. 
16. Northern Territory Government Department of Health. Notifiable diseases to be 
reported in the NT. Darwin: Northern Territory Government Department of Health, 
2013. [cited 01 April 2015] Available from: 
https://health.nt.gov.au/library/scripts/objectifyMedia.aspx?file=pdf/20/49.pdf&siteID=
1&str_title=Notifiable%20conditions%20to%20be%20reported%20in%20the%20NT.p
df   
17. Northern Territory Government Department of Health. Notifiable diseases for 
medical practitioners in the NT. Darwin: Northern Territory Government Department of 
Health, 2015. [cited 03 April 2015] Available from: 
http://www.health.nt.gov.au/Centre_for_Disease_Control/Notifiable_Diseases/index.asp
x 
18. Food Act, Northern Territory [stature on the internet]. c2013 [cited 03 April 2015] 
Available from: 
http://notes.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislat/legislat.nsf/2afcb7bfe1e1348e6925705a001697fb/7ea
16e5882917cba69257c31007b7242/$FILE/Repf020.pdf   
19. Council of Australian Governments. National Indigenous Reform Agreement 
(Closing the Gap). Canberra: Council of Australian Governments, 2008. [cited 03 April 
2015] Available from: 
http://www.federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/content/npa/health_indigenous/indigenous-
reform/national-agreement_sept_12.pdf   
20. Draper ADK. OzFoodNet - Enhancing Foodborne Disease Surveillance Across 
Australia. Annual Report 2014 - Northern Territory. Northern Territory Government 
Department of Health. 2015. 
21. Henning K. Overview of Syndromic Surveillance. What is Syndromic Surveillance? 
MMWR Supplement 2004; 53: 5-11. 
22. Hope K, Durheim DN, Tursan d’Espaignet, & Dalton C. Syndromic surveillance: is 
it a useful tool for local outbreak detection? J Epidemiol Community Health.2006; 
60(5): 374-375. [cited 03 April 2015] Available from: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2563979/pdf/374.pdf  
23. Markey P. Proposal for access to NT Emergency Department data by CDC staff for 
syndromic surveillance and detection of notifiable diseases. 2006. 
24. Notifiable Diseases Act, Northern Territory [stature on the internet]. c1981 [cited 01 
April 2015] Available from: 
http://notes.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislat/legislat.nsf/d989974724db65b1482561cf0017cbd2/1
8c1d847d87d409f69257c31007c9cb0/$FILE/ATT8VOU3.pdf/Repn009.pdf  
 
174 
25. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. Updated guidelines for evaluating 
public health surveillance systems. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2001; 50: 1-35. 
26. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. Framework for Evaluating Public 
Health Surveillance Systems for Early Detection of Outbreaks. MMWR Recomm Rep. 
2004; 53: 1-11. 
27. World Health Organisation (WHO). International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision; 2010. Available from: 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en  
 
 
 
  
 
175 
Appendix 1. Presenting complaints at RDH ED. 
Code Complaint 
ABRA Abrasion 
ABSS Abscess 
ACOP Acopia 
ALWD Alcohol withdrawal 
ALCO Alcohol intoxication 
ALGY Allergic reaction/anaphylaxis 
ALTC Altered conscious state 
AMPT Amputation 
ARST Arrest (cardio/pulmonary) 
ARRY Arrythmia 
ASLT Assault 
ASTH Asthma 
BITE Bite/sting/envenomation 
BLDG Bleed – GIT 
BLDU Bleed – urinary 
BLDC Bleed – cerebral 
BLDE Bleed – epistaxis 
BLDV Bleed – vaginal 
BAL Blood alcohol level 
BPR Blood police request 
BURN Burns 
CVA CVA? TIA? 
CARD Cardiac chest pain 
CELU Cellulitis 
CHES Chest pain 
ISCH Circulatory-ischaemia 
COLL Collapse 
CONC Concussion 
CONV Conjunctivitis 
CONS Constipation 
COU Cough 
CROP Croup 
CRSH Crush injury 
DOA DOA 
DVT DVT? 
DENT Dental 
DETX Detox request 
DIBH Diabetes-hyper 
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Code Complaint 
DIBD Diabetes-hypo 
DIBB Diabetes – unstable 
DIBU Diabetes – unstable 
DIAR Diarrhoea 
DIS Disaster 
DISL Dislocation 
DIZZ Dizzy 
DRSG Dressing 
DRWN Drowning 
DOD Drug overdose 
DAD Drug administration 
DYS Dysphagia 
DYST Dystonic reaction 
ENTO ENT other 
EARP Ear problem 
ELCT Electrocution 
EPIS Epistaxis 
EYIJ Eye injury 
EYIF Eye infection/irritation 
EYEV Eye – vision loss 
FEB Febrile illness 
FIST Fistula haemodialysis 
FBOT Foreign body – other 
FRAC Fracture 
FRCN Fracture – NOF? 
FRCC Fracture – colles? 
GYNA Gynaecological 
H&M Haematemisis & Melaena 
HAEM Haematemesis 
HAEP Haemoptysis 
HEDA Headache 
HERN Hernia unspecified 
HOT Hyperthermia 
COLD Hypothermia 
INR I.N.R. 
INFC Infection 
INHA Inhalation 
INJY Injury 
PIRR Irritable child 
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Code Complaint 
LOC LOC/Concussion 
BABY Labour 
LAC Laceration 
LESN Lesions 
LUMP Lump 
MAL Malaise 
MALA Malaria 
SCP Medication script 
MELA Melaena 
MIGR Migraine 
TMC Miscarriage 
NAUS Nausea 
OTH Other/unspecified 
OD Overdose/ingestion/poisoning 
POP POP check 
PEAR Pain – ear/s 
PAIN Pain – specify 
PTON Pain – throat/tonsils 
PABD Pain – abdomen 
PCHS Pain – chest non-cardiac 
PGRN Pain – groin 
PHIP Pain – hip 
PLIM Pain – limb 
PLOI Pain – loin 
PNCK Pain – neck 
PPEL Pain – pelvis 
PSCR Pain – scrotal 
PSH Pain – shoulder 
PANL Pain – anal/perianal 
PBCK Pain – back 
PEPI Pain – epigastric 
PFAC Pain – face 
PALP Palpitations 
PARA Paraesthesia 
PATH Pathogen exposure 
POI Poisoning 
PSYB Psychiatric – behaviour 
PSYE Psychiatric – eating disorder 
PSYH Psychiatric – harm 
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Code Complaint 
PSYM Psychiatric – mood 
PSYR  Psychiatric – relationships 
PSYT Psychiatric – thoughts 
RASH Rash/itch 
ROS Removal of sutures 
RENC Renal colic 
RENF Renal failure/dysfunction 
RENR Renal – urinary retention 
RESP Respiratory infection 
REVE Review in emergency 
REVU Review – inpatient unit 
RHIN Rhinorrhoea 
SCAB Scabies 
SEZA Seizure – atypical 
SEIZ Seizure/post ictal 
SEPT Septic 
SHRP Sharps or pathogen exposure 
SHCK Shock 
SOB Short of breath 
SOBA Short of breath – APO? 
SOBB Short of breath – asthma? 
SOBC Short of breath – COAD? 
ULCR Skin – ulcer 
SOC Social/placement problem 
STI Soft tissue injury: general 
SPEE Speech – dysphasia 
STAB Stab wound 
SYNC Syncope 
TRAF Trauma foot/ankle 
TLIM Trauma – limb 
TABD Trauma – abdomen 
TCHS Trauma – chest 
TFAC Trauma – face 
THAN Trauma – hand 
THED Trauma – head 
TMUL Trauma – multiple 
TSPN Trauma – spine 
UNCO Unconscious 
URTI Upper respiratory tract infection 
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Code Complaint 
URRT Urinary retention 
URND Urinary – dysuria/UTI? 
VIOL Violent behaviour 
VIRL Viral illness 
V+D Vomiting/diarrhoea 
VOMN Vomiting/nausea 
WEAK Weakness 
WOUN Wound breakdown 
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Prologue 
I first worked in Timor-Leste (East Timor) in 2008. I went for a 3-month contract but 
ended up staying for 5 years and came back to Australia with a Timorese wife. As a 
result I am now inextricably tied to Timor. 
When I lived in Timor, I worked at the heavily fortified Helipod (HPOD) base in a field 
hospital that was established specifically to look after members of the International 
Stabilisation Force (ISF). The people we looked after were members of the Australian 
and New Zealand defence forces, United Nations staff and other expats lucky enough to 
talk their way past security at the front of the base. Those lucky enough to be treated at 
the HPOD medical facility received an Australian standard of health care; an island of 
luxury surrounded by an ocean of poverty. Directly across the road from the HPOD is 
the Bairo Pite Clinic (BPC) - a completely different story.  
The BPC runs on a shoestring budget and sees about 200 outpatients per day, delivers 
about 100 babies per month and cares for about 2500 medical emergencies per month – 
all at no cost to the patient. The clinic relies heavily on donations from individuals and 
organisations across the world including a heavy reliance on volunteer nursing and 
medical staff.  
The BPC diagnoses and treats more tuberculosis (TB) cases than any other facility in 
Timor-Leste. One of my good friends, Dr Josh Francis is a paediatric infectious disease 
specialist at Royal Darwin Hospital (RDH) and is on the medical advisory board at 
BPC. He also travels to Dili a few times each year to work at the clinic. He is 
particularly interested in TB diagnosis and management and asked if I could analyse the 
TB data at the clinic as part of my studies. 
Most of my experience as a Masters of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) scholar has been 
focused on enteric disease, given my role since 2012 has been as the OzFoodNet 
epidemiologist in the Northern Territory (NT). I did however hope to do a project on 
another communicable disease as part of my studies and also something involving 
Timor. This project ticked both boxes. 
An ad hoc data collection system has been in place since October 2013 for persons 
diagnosed with TB at the BPC. This system was instigated to collect data on clinical 
symptoms, diagnostic tests and to monitor treatment of TB patients and contacts of TB. 
My involvement in analysing this dataset was to describe the epidemiology of TB cases 
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diagnosed at the BPC and submit this in the form of an article to a peer review journal. 
An unforeseen outcome of my analysis of the data was to make recommendations for 
more efficient and accurate data collection and analysis in the future. 
My role 
My role in this project was to analyse data provided to me by the BPC. I was provided 
data by the clinic and analysed this remotely, in Darwin. After analysing the data and 
after consultation with the stakeholders at BPC, I cleaned the data, created a new data 
dictionary and advocated for a new program to house the BPC TB database/registry. 
Other staff at the NT CDC, particularly Mr Christian James, volunteered their time to 
create a new database based on my recommendations. This is currently in progress. 
Lessons learned 
This was my first experience with TB. I have come to appreciate that TB is a 
complicated disease to diagnose, treat and monitor. In the developed world it is a tricky 
disease to deal with. In the developing world and in resource-limited settings it is even 
more so.  
I envisaged that this project would involve the simple task of uploading a dataset into 
Stata
®
, cleaning it a little and then analysing it. This was not the case. The data I 
analysed were not clean, observations were recorded inconsistently, there were lots of 
missing values and there were plenty of non-sensical entries. This project highlighted to 
me the importance of ensuring high quality data entry in order to be able to analyse data 
promptly and accurately and take resultant public health action. One of the goals of 
recording this data was for the clinic to be able to easily determine who was missing TB 
treatment and to get medication to them. I quickly determined that the quality of data in 
this dataset did not allow for this to occur quickly. I developed a data dictionary and 
learned to carefully code for all foreseeable data entry events. 
Another major learning point for me was that Epi Info
TM
 was not suitable in this 
instance as a tool to facilitate a new dataset. I have always subscribed to the notion that 
simple processes and systems are the best, especially in limited resource settings. I 
toiled for many weeks trying to develop a new database for the clinic using Epi Info
TM
 
but it was a frustrating experience and I felt that in the end it would not improve the 
ease of use of the current database. Ease of use could not be compromised in a busy and 
ill-resourced clinic. I learned that I did however have the ability to influence the 
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creation of a new system. I have cleaned the dataset, rationalised and reduced the 
number of variables recorded, created a data dictionary and given this back to the clinic 
to upload and continue working with. It is not ideal but it is a vast improvement. 
Public health impact 
The findings of this report will enable the BPC to more efficiently record information 
from cases of TB diagnosed at the clinic. The creation of a data dictionary and the 
rationalisation of the number of variables collected may improve quality of data and 
acceptance of the system. At the time of writing, a new database was under construction 
based on the rationalised set of variables and data dictionary created as a result of this 
project. A new automatic reporting tool would be ideal so that the data required by the 
National Tuberculosis Program (NTP) can be generated easily and regularly, and so 
treatment and contact tracing priorities can be readily identified.  
The ultimate public health impact of my work will be a new database and reporting tool 
that is simple to use and acceptable in a limited resource setting.  
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Abstract 
Introduction 
The incidence of tuberculosis (TB) in Timor-Leste is estimated to be 498 cases per 
100,000 population per year; one of the highest in the world. Around one third of TB 
cases in Timor-Leste are managed by the Bairo Pite clinic (BPC), which works with the 
National TB Program, and has a focus on providing preventative treatment to children 
exposed to TB. To improve the recognition, diagnosis, prevention and control of TB in 
Timor-Leste, we analysed routinely collected clinical data on TB cases diagnosed and 
treated at BPC. The primary aim was to describe the epidemiology of TB cases 
diagnosed at the BPC with a focus on differences between adults and paediatric cases. 
Secondary aims were to clean and refine the data and produce a data dictionary for users 
as well as investigate tools for data collection and management.   
Methods 
Demographic, clinical and diagnostic information was extracted from the BPC TB 
database on all cases diagnosed between October 2013 and September 2015. Data 
quality was assessed and duplicates and non-sensical data points were removed. 
Descriptive analysis of baseline characteristics was undertaken and factors influencing 
presentation of adults versus paediatric cases were compared using odds ratios and chi-
square tests for significance. Variables were rationalised and a new data dictionary was 
developed for the database. Attempts to construct a new database were made using Epi 
Info
TM
 and later, REDCap.
TM
 
Results  
There was a large amount of incomplete and free-text data in the database. Most of the 
161 variables measured had missing data for at least one record; 84 (52%) contained 
more than 50% missing data. The variables with the most missing data related to 
treatment and outcomes.  
Of the 1450 cases of TB diagnosed at the BPC between October 2013 and September 
2015; 228 (16%) were aged under 15 years. The majority (51%) of cases were clinically 
diagnosed with chest x-rays only performed on 47% of children and 42% of adults with 
TB. Only 24% of children and 42% of adults had a positive sputum smear sample by 
microscopy. Children were 1.6 times more likely than adults to come from outside the 
capital, Dili (95% CI 1.1-2.2, p<0.01). Children with TB were 5.8 times more likely to 
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be identified through contact tracing than adults (95% CI 4.4-7.5, p<0.01). A new data 
dictionary was created which rationalised and categorised data if appropriate. Epi 
Info
TM
 proved unsuitable to use to host the database due to stability issues. Production 
of a database using REDCap
TM
 is currently in progress. 
Conclusions 
Paediatric TB is common at the BPC. Contact tracing is detecting more paediatric cases 
than adults so efforts should be expanded further to improve detection of adult cases to 
improve implementation of preventative therapy and stop ongoing transmission. 
Consideration should be given to increasing TB activities in rural areas. Bacteriological 
confirmation of TB occurred for less than half of all cases and may be improved by 
selectively using PCR technology, in line with NTP guidelines. Improved access to free 
public x-ray may also improve diagnoses. The BPC TB register needs to collect 
appropriate and accurate information which can be used by staff at the clinic to improve 
and optimise their public health action, particularly with regard to seeking 
bacteriological confirmation of cases, contact tracing and implementation of 
preventative therapy.  
I recommend that the data dictionary and data collection form developed from this 
project is implemented and ultimately used to develop a new database host the BPC TB 
registry. The BPC TB registry should be evaluated 1 year after the implementation of 
the new data collection and monitoring system. 
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Introduction 
The incidence of tuberculosis (TB) in Timor-Leste (East Timor) is estimated at 498 
cases per 100,000 population which is one of the highest in the world.
1
 World Health 
Organisation (WHO)
2,3
 and Timor-Leste National Tuberculosis Control Program 
(NTP)
4
 guidelines emphasise the importance of operational TB research. A recent 
attempt to identify national health research priorities in Timor-Leste promoted the 
concept of strengthened capacity for operational research with a focus on causes of 
childhood morbidity and mortality, including TB.
5
  
Timor-Leste 
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (Timor-Leste), also commonly and 
incorrectly called, East Timor is a small mountainous country of approximately 1.2 
million people situated an hour’s plane journey from Darwin, Australia’s most northerly 
capital city (Figure 1).
6
  
 
Figure 1. Location of Timor-Leste in the South East Asian region. 
The eastern half of the island of Timor as well as the Oecusse region on the north coast 
was colonised by Portugal and known as Portuguese Timor for almost five centuries 
after traders and missionaries arrived on the island in 1515.
7
 In 1975, the dissolution of 
the Portuguese empire resulted in Timor-Leste unilaterally declaring its independence in 
November of that year. Shortly thereafter in December 1975, Indonesia invaded and 
annexed the territory as the 27
th
 province of Indonesia, renaming it Timur Timur. The 
United Nations (UN) opposed the Indonesian invasion
8
 but the Australian and American 
Governments were complicit. They feared that the major political party in the newly 
independent Timor-Leste, Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente 
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(FRETILIN) would form a communist state on Australia’s doorstep. Indonesia’s 
occupation is estimated to have cost at least 100,000 - 180,000 Timorese lives as a 
result of military action, murder, starvation, hunger and disease.
9
 
In 1999, under direct UN observation, Indonesia held a referendum asking Timorese to 
vote for independence or to remain as an autonomous territory of Indonesia. Timorese 
voted for independence and almost immediately, Indonesian sponsored militia went on 
a rampage, murdering Timorese civilians, displacing almost half a million people and 
looting and destroying almost every building in the country.
7
 The UN Security Council 
resolved to authorise an Australian led peacekeeping force of approximately 11,000 
personnel to deploy to Timor-Leste to quell the violence and return peace and stability 
to the nascent nation.
10
 This International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) eventually 
made way for the United Nationals Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) which provided administration and peacekeeping in the country until its 
formal independence in May 2002.
11
  
After 4 years of relative peace, Timor-Leste once again descended into civil unrest in 
2006 after factions of the military deserted their barracks in protest at alleged 
discrimination against them, due to them being predominantly from the western region 
of the nation. Violence escalated between this group of petitioning soldiers, the 
Timorese defence force (FDTL) whose officers were predominantly from the eastern 
region of the country, the Timorese national police (PNTL) whose members mostly 
came from the western part of the country and gangs aligned to either western or eastern 
regions. The violence that erupted led to at least 155,000 people fleeing their homes and 
the widespread destruction of property and infrastructure.
12
 Once again, an Australian 
led military deployment (International Stabilisation Force or ‘ISF’)13 was followed by a 
large UN peacekeeping mission known as the United Nations Integrated Mission in East 
Timor (UNMIT).
14
 In February 2008 an assassination attempt was made on the 
president of Timor-Leste, Dr Jose Ramos Horta by rebel soldiers but following his 
survival, fears of further violence did not eventuate. In early 2013, the final ISF soldiers 
and UNMIT peacekeeping police were finally withdrawn from Timor-Leste and the 
country has experienced a period of peace, stability and steady economic growth until 
now. 
The suffering that occurred between 1975-1999 during the Indonesian occupation, in 
1999 immediately following the referendum and finally between 2006-2008 during the 
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most recent crisis, severely affected all basic infrastructure in Timor-Leste. Despite this, 
Timor-Leste has made great strides forward in building infrastructure, halving infant 
and child mortality rates and making significant efforts to improve health and education 
and create employment opportunities for its young population.
6
 However, it is accepted 
that it can take up to 30 years for a nation to transition from fragility and instability and 
to build resilience.
15
 Timor-Leste is currently a country rising from the ashes. 
Bairo Pite Clinic 
The Bairo Pite Clinic (BPC) was founded in 1999 in the Dili suburb (Portuguese 
“bairro”) of Bairo Pite, during the ‘scorched earth’ withdrawal of Indonesian troops 
from occupied East Timor.
16
 The clinic was established by a lusophonic American 
doctor, Dr Daniel Murphy (Figure 2) who had come to Timor-Leste after previously 
working as a doctor serving the poor in Mozambique, Laos and Nicaragua.
16,17 
  
 
Figure 2. Dr Daniel Murphy, founder of the Bairo Pite Clinic. 
Dr Daniel Murphy, or ‘Dr Dan’ as he is universally known in Timor-Leste, is a cult 
figure. He has been awarded Timor’s highest honour, the Medalha do Merito de Timor-
Leste (Medal of Merit) and the Sergio de Melo Award for his services to the people of 
Timor-Leste.
16
 In 1999, his clinic was the only health post operating during the violent 
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Indonesian withdrawal and until now the Bairo Pite Clinic is one of the most trusted and 
well patronised health clinics in the country. The clinic sees on average 200 outpatients 
per day, delivers over 100 babies per month, sees 2500 emergency presentations per 
year and admits 2000 patients to its wards. The clinic diagnoses more TB cases than any 
other facility in Timor and also runs TB treatment and prevention programs.
16 
Most TB 
cases are diagnosed based on clinical symptoms and done so at the discretion of the 
clinician. The clinic is not part of the government network of clinics and to remain 
solvent it relies heavily on volunteers and donations.
18 
Expatriate staff, particularly from 
Australia, the United States (US), the United Kingdom and New Zealand such as 
doctors, nurses, medical students, pharmacists and scientists regularly bolster the local 
Timorese staffing capacity and also provide mentorship. Other maintenance and 
infrastructure improvements are commonly supported or donated by philanthropic and 
community groups as well as the US military. The clinic always operates with the threat 
of financial crisis looming.
18
 
Tuberculosis 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis is the aerobic bacterium that causes the disease, TB. The 
bacterium is spread when an infected person expels viable organisms, most commonly 
by coughing, to a susceptible person.
19
 Overcrowding, such as that which occurs in poor 
and developing countries increases the risk of exposure.
19
 Only 10% of people infected 
by the bacteria will go on to immediately develop the pulmonary or extrapulmonary 
symptoms of an active TB infection. The remainder will have what is known as latent 
TB, where the bacterium lays dormant in their bodies and may reactivate at a later 
stage.
19
 In 2014, 9.6 million people were estimated to have fallen ill with TB resulting 
in 1.5 million deaths.
1
 Over 80% of people diagnosed with TB are from developing 
countries and 12% of the 9.6 million newly diagnosed TB cases in 2015 were human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive.
1
  
Latent TB infection (LTBI) can be detected by tuberculin skin testing or interferon 
gamma release assays. Active TB disease is normally diagnosed with the help of 
investigations like chest x-ray, mycobacterial culture and sputum smear microscopy 
which looks for the presence of acid-fast bacilli (AFB) in sputum when examined by 
light microscopy.
19
 If the person has AFB in their sputum then they are at risk of 
spreading the disease to others when they cough, sneeze, or talk. 
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The control and prevention of TB focuses on the use of antibiotics to treat and cure 
patients with active TB and to prevent those with latent TB from progressing to active 
TB disease. Close monitoring of contacts of infectious TB cases and the administration 
of preventative antibiotic therapy is increasingly recognised as crucial in TB control and 
prevention.
19
 Treatment regimens for both active and latent TB are most commonly 6 
months in duration. Unsurprisingly, adherence is poor.
19
 To increase adherence, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) recommends that TB treatment is given by direct 
observation of therapy (DOT)
20 
where healthcare workers or community workers 
observe while the patient swallows the tablet. This is considered best practice. 
Controlling TB in Timor-Leste is a massive challenge. The difficulty of managing a 
high burden of TB in the nation
1 
combined with the complexity of standard TB control 
and prevention methods
19
 is magnified due to a lack of basic infrastructure, urban 
migration and subsequent overcrowding following decades of political instability. Vast 
mountainous terrain and an unreliable procurement process for medications adds to the 
difficulty.
21
  
BPC TB database 
Since 2013, patients diagnosed with TB at the BPC have had information regarding 
their demographics, clinical presentation, examination, diagnostic pathway, and 
treatment recorded on a standardised proforma. This information is collected as part of 
routine clinical care for patients being treated for TB by doctors and nurses. The 
objective of the database is to enable staff at the clinic to quickly assess the numbers of 
patients who are currently undergoing treatment or preventative therapy, generate 
mandatory reports required by the NTP and to contribute to the knowledge of the 
epidemiology of TB in Timor-Leste.
4
 
Patient treatment Forms are written and completed in English by doctors, nurses and 
health care practitioners at the time of treatment or consultation. Those who complete 
the forms come from a wide range of language and education backgrounds and as a 
result proficiency varies greatly amongst staff. Treatment information is collected and 
entered using the Timor-Leste NTP standard TB treatment card.
4
 All treatment and 
follow up information is recorded on these hard copy forms which are used actively to 
monitor who is on treatment and does not allow for rapid assessment of the number of 
cases and contacts undergoing treatment at any given time. This information is 
subsequently entered into a Microsoft
®
 Office Access
®
 database by volunteers at the 
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clinic, who are typically medical students. Data are not entered when staff are 
unavailable and this commonly leads to delays in data entry. Prior to this project there 
was no data dictionary for the database. 
Routine analysis of data in the BPC TB database is conducted using Microsoft
®
 Excel
®
. 
This analysis is usually performed by senior local health care workers or foreign trained 
doctors in order to achieve standard reporting requirements to the NTP and to present 
data at conferences. Data analyses have generally been conducted in an ad hoc fashion 
and due to resource limitations it has been difficult to easily produce accurate and 
timely reports.  
Dr Francis from the BPC was interested in analysing the data in the registry to 
particularly to compare features of adults vs children diagnosed with TB at BPC. This 
was due to the NTP’s stated aim of focusing on paediatric TB4 as well as Dr Francis’ 
main role at the clinic as a visiting paediatrician and infectious diseases physician. I was 
approached to undertake this analysis and to rationalise the database so that accurate 
and timely analysis could be conducted more easily.   
Epi Info
TM
  
Epi Info
TM
 is free downloadable software from the Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention that allows public health practitioners and researchers to construct databases, 
create data entry forms, customise data entry and conduct data analyses with 
epidemiologic statistics.
22
 It is designed for outbreak investigations and for small to 
mid-sized surveillance systems and is intended to be used by people with limited 
computer skills. Due to these characteristics I intended to design a TB database in Epi 
Info
TM
 for BPC, as part of this project.   
Epi Info
TM
 training was delivered to the Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) 2015 
cohort at the course block at the Australian National University (ANU) in March 2015. 
As it is free, easily accessible software and I had already received training, I intended to 
use Epi Info
TM
 to create a database and forms for the BPC. It is an intuitive program to 
use and a database can be created by using a data dictionary to create forms and 
questionnaires. Input into the database can be controlled by having restricted options for 
responses, e.g. using drop down selections and radio buttons as inputs for responses to 
questions to limit free text. Data can be entered into Epi Info
TM 
directly through the 
‘form’ which on the computer acts as a data entry screen to the database which is in 
Microsoft
®
 Office Access
®
 ‘behind’ the program. These forms can also be printed out 
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so that information can be recorded on hardcopy forms to be entered into the database at 
a later time. There is also the ability to enter data into the Epi Info
TM 
app on a 
smartphone which can then be uploaded into the database at a later time. 
Aims and objectives of data analysis project 
The primary aim of this project was to describe the epidemiology of TB cases 
diagnosed at the BPC in Timor-Leste in terms of demographics, clinical presentation, 
diagnostic pathway and treatment, with a focus on differences between adult and 
paediatric cases. 
During the project, two additional objectives were generated: 
2. To clean the data in the dataset, refine and rationalise the variables that will be 
recorded for cases in the future and create a data dictionary for users. 
3. To investigate other possible tools for data collection and management for the BPC 
TB program. 
Methods 
Permissions required 
Ethics approval was granted by the Gabinete Etika de Instituto Nasional de Saude de 
Timor-Leste (Ethics Cabinet of the Timor-Leste Institute of Health) and from the 
Human Research Ethics Committee of the Australian National University.  
Data Collection and analysis 
Assessment of data quality 
The BPC provided a data extract from the BPC TB database representing patients 
diagnosed with TB at the clinic between 1 October 2013 and 30 September 2015. 
Data cleaning took place via manual examination for non-sensical values and 
duplicates. Nonsensical data were defined as those data which had no basis in reality. 
Duplicates and non-sensical data points were removed.  
Data quality was assessed by the number of missing entries per variable, timeliness 
from data collection to data entry and frequency of non-sensical data points per variable. 
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Descriptive and analytical analysis 
Simple descriptive statistics were used to describe cases were described by age group, 
sex, risk factors, symptomatology, diagnostic factors and treatment information.  
The characteristics of paediatric cases were then compared with those of adult TB cases. 
To compare continuous variables that were not normally distributed we used the Mann 
Whitney test (there were no normally distributed continuous variables). The χ2 test was 
used to compare differences between proportions with a Fisher’s exact test used for 
small numbers. Odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) were calculated for 
binary variables. When an OR was infinite or undefined, exact logistic regression was 
used to calculate an OR and 95% CI. P values were considered significant at the 0.05 
level. 
All data were analysed using Intercooled Stata 13.1
®
 and figures were created using 
Microsoft
®
 Excel 2010. 
Rationalisation of variables and development of a data dictionary 
In consultation with Dr Joshua Francis and Dr Charlotte Hall from the BPC, a review of 
the variables to be collected for this data base was undertaken. This included 
rationalising the number of variables collected (based on their usefulness of the 
information for public health action. In addition a new data dictionary was developed in 
order to aid data entry that included refining how variables were collected. Free text 
entries were rationalised into categorical variables where possible using logical 
categories defined by known entities (e.g. treatment categories, diagnostic categories, 
sex, district of residence) or by generating categories based on frequencies of free text 
responses in the database. Some variables were deemed unnecessary and omitted from 
the new data dictionary. A new data collection form was generated based on the data 
dictionary. 
Database development 
The new data dictionary was used to develop a new database using the free software 
developed by the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention,
22
 Epi Info
TM
. 
REDCap
TM
, a web based application for building and managing databases managed by 
Vanderbilt University in the USA, was also trialed.
23
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Forms were created in Epi Info
TM
 using the new data dictionary as a guide. From these 
forms Epi Info
TM
 automatically created a dataset based on the variables specified in the 
forms. Dummy data were entered into Epi Info
TM
 by myself in Darwin as a trial to 
determine whether it was suitable as a new database tool. After Epi Info
TM
 was deemed 
unsuitable for hosting the database, Mr Christian James at the NT CDC was asked to 
investigate the use of REDCap
TM
 for hosting the database. At the time of writing, the 
database was nearing completion and looked promising. 
Results  
Data quality 
A summary of the key characteristics of the dataset are found in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of key characteristics of BPC TB database. 
Number of observations 1453 
Number of observations (with duplicates and blanks removed) 1450 
Number of variables 165 
    Number of string variables 138 
        Number of date variables 18 
        Number of categorical variables recorded as free text 84 
    Number of numerical variables 28 
        Number of integer variables 5 
        Number of byte variables 19 
        Number of float variables 3 
    Number of variables with missing values    161 
        Number of variables with >25% missing values 97 
        Number of variables with >50% missing values 84 
        Number of variables with >75% missing values 56 
        Number of variables with 100% missing values 11 
 
On the whole, data completeness was low. Most of the 161 variables measured had 
missing data for at least one record; 84 (52%) contained more than 50% missing data 
(see Table 2). Many of these variables related to treatment and DOT outcomes, which 
would normally be entered at completion of treatment. Variables that can be collected at 
the time of diagnosis had higher levels of completeness. In terms of demographic 
variables, while gender and place of residence had 100% completeness, of the 1450 
cases in the register, 862 (59%) did not have a date of birth recorded. 
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Table 2. Completeness of demographics, risk factors, symptoms and health behaviours 
recorded in the BPC TB database (n=1450). 
Variable Records Completeness (%) 
Demographics and risk factors   
Sex 1450 100 
Rural resident 
(vs Dili) 
1450 100 
Second address in rural area 1450 100 
Newly diagnosed or previous HIV positive 1450 100 
Inpatient 1394 96 
Identified through contact tracing 1356 94 
Previous TB 1216 84 
Known contact with TB case 1113 77 
Malnutrition 1055 73 
Evidence of BCG (Bacille Calmette-Guerin) vaccine 935 64 
Symptoms   
Abdominal pain or discomfort 1450 100 
Back pain 1450 100 
Chest pain 1450 100 
Headache 1450 100 
Hoarse voice 1450 100 
Vomiting 1450 100 
Musculoskeletal pain 1450 100 
Cough 1311 90 
Dyspnoea 1284 89 
Lymphadenopathy 1293 89 
Fever 1285 89 
Haemoptysis 1286 89 
Weight loss 1295 89 
Night sweats 1286 89 
Productive cough 1283 88 
Lethargy 1273 88 
Febrile on presentation 1011 70 
Pallor 1012 70 
Tachycardia 1011 70 
Systemic symptoms present 1011 70 
Dates   
Date presented  1449 99 
Date therapy commenced 1390 96 
Onset date 1295 89 
Date completed 0 0 
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Variable Records Completeness (%) 
Treatment details   
Completed intensive phase 12 99 
Sputum smear positive result after intensive phase 
completed? 
8 
99 
Completed continuation phase 12 99 
Treatment outcome – Cured? 12 99 
Sputum smear negative - 3 months post treatment? 5 99 
Sputum smear negative - 5 months post treatment? 5 99 
Sputum smear negative - 8 months post treatment? 5 99 
Weight recorded– 1 month post diagnosis? 0 100 
Weight recorded – 2 months post diagnosis? 8 99 
Weight recorded – 3 months post diagnosis? 0 100 
Weight recorded – 4 months post diagnosis? 0 100 
Weight recorded – 5 months post diagnosis? 6 99 
Weight recorded – 6 months post diagnosis? 0 100 
Weight recorded – 7 months post diagnosis? 0 100 
Weight recorded – 8 months post diagnosis? 6 99 
 
The median time between someone presenting at the BPC clinic and being entered into 
the BPC TB registry was 83 days (range 0-383 days). There are no cases entered into 
the registry after May 2015 and this represents the lag time to enter cases into the 
register from paper forms.  
Free text variables tended to be recorded in multiple ways. The 2 variables which record 
which TB medications and other medications were prescribed were recorded as free text 
fields in the registry. As a result there were 126 unique inputs for TB medications 
prescribed (i.e. there are only 4-5 TB drugs available at the clinic but they were 
annotated in the database in 126 different ways). This variable contained information 
for 1397/1450 (96%) of cases. There were 929/1450 (64%) cases with information 
recorded for other non-TB medications prescribed and for this variable there were 408 
unique values recorded. 
The variables which recorded the health centres where the intensive phase treatment and 
continuation phase treatment occurred were well completed (99% and 98% 
respectively) but were free text and contained 65 and 86 unique values recorded 
respectively. Other variables relating to treatments and outcomes are shown in Table 2 
and were characterised by a high proportion of missing entries.   
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Epidemiology of TB at BPC 
Descriptive analysis 
Demographics and risk factors 
The proportion of TB cases diagnosed at BPC by age group is shown in Table 3. The 
median age of cases at diagnosis was 28 years (range 0-86) and the mean was 33 years. 
Table 3. Cases of TB diagnosed at BPC by age group. 
Age group Number of cases Percentage of total (%) 
< 1 year old 55 4 
1-4 years old 89 6 
5-9 years old 35 2 
10-14 years old 40 3 
Adults (15 years and older) 1231 85 
Total 1450 100 
 
Figure 3 shows the number of cases of TB diagnosed at BPC each month. There were 
no cases entered in the register after May 2015. 
 
Figure 3. Epicurve of TB cases diagnosed at BPC by month of diagnosis (October 2013 – 
September 2015). 
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The demographics and risk factors of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and adults 
are shown in Table 4. There were similar proportions of male and female cases. Almost 
half (48%) of paediatric cases and 77% of adult cases were admitted to BPC as 
inpatients. Over half (51%) of paediatric cases had known contact with someone with 
TB.  
Table 4. Demographics and risk factors of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and 
adults.  
Demographics and risk 
factors 
Children Adults 
Total* 
n % Total n % Total 
Male 111 51 219 629 51 1231 1450 
Inpatient 95 48 197 925 77 1197 1394 
Rural resident 
(vs Dili) 31 14 219 104 8 1231 1450 
Second address in rural 
area 28 13 219 268 22 1231 1450 
Known contact with TB 
case 77 51 151 313 33 962 1113 
Evidence of BCG vaccine 70 63 112 341 41 823 935 
Malnutrition 68 49 139 185 20 916 1055 
Identified through contact 
tracing 20 11 190 7 1 1166 1356 
Previous TB 4 2 168 194 19 1048 1216 
Newly diagnosed or 
previous HIV positive 2 1 219 15 1 1231 1450 
*Where total less than 1450, this represents missing data for this variable 
 
Symptoms  
Table 5 shows symptoms of children and adults diagnosed with TB at the BPC. The 
most commonly reported symptoms of TB cases were cough, weight loss, night sweats, 
fever and systemic symptoms.  
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Table 5. Symptoms of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and adults.  
Symptom 
Children Adults Total 
* n % Total n % Total 
Cough 149 79 188 917 82 1123 1311 
Productive cough 24 13 178 617 56 1105 1283 
Haemoptysis 12 7 179 409 37 1107 1286 
Dyspnoea 54 30 180 410 37 1104 1284 
Weight loss 117 63 186 840 76 1109 1295 
Night sweats 82 45 184 541 49 1102 1286 
Fever 80 44 181 461 42 1104 1285 
Systemic symptoms present 62 56 110 309 34 901 1011 
Lethargy 51 29 178 589 54 1095 1273 
Tachycardia 49 45 110 182 20 901 1013 
Febrile on presentation 38 35 110 182 20 901 1011 
Lymphadenopathy 19 10 182 136 12 1111 1293 
Abdominal pain or 
discomfort 6 3 219 67 5 1231 1450 
Pallor 6 5 110 75 8 902 1013 
Chest pain 4 2 219 226 18 1231 1450 
Vomiting 3 1 219 21 2 1231 1450 
Musculoskeletal pain 2 1 219 154 13 1231 1450 
Headache 1 0 219 59 5 1231 1450 
Hoarse voice 0 0 219 15 1 1231 1450 
Back pain 0 0 219 115 9 1231 1450 
*Where total less than 1450, this represents missing data for this variable 
 
Diagnostic information 
Table 6 shows diagnostic information reported in the BPC TB register. Of note, Chest 
x-rays were performed on less than half of 1450 cases that were diagnosed, while only 
46% were bacteriologically confirmed (n=1108).  
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Table 6. Diagnostic information of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and adults. 
Diagnostic information 
Children Adults Total 
* 
n % Total n % Total  
Chest x-ray performed 82 47 176 467 42 1102 1278 
Abnormal x-ray finding 57 69 82 377 81 467 549 
Pulmonary TB  163 74 219 855 69 1231 1450 
Extrapulmonary TB 48 22 219 292 24 1231 1450 
Pulmonary and 
extrapulmonary TB 
7 3 219 83 7 1231 1450 
Sputum smear sample 
collected 
21 10 219 904 73 1231 1450 
Sputum smear positive 5 24 21 377 42 904 925 
Confirmed Pulmonary TB
†
  7 4 170 499 53 938 1108 
HIV Test performed 90 48 187 964 82 1169 1356 
* Where total less than 1450, this represents missing data for this variable   
† Confirmed by microscopy, polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or culture 
The proportion of pulmonary TB cases diagnosed at BPC that were bacteriologically 
confirmed varied by week of diagnosis from 0% to 100% with a median of 44%. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4. There were no cases entered into the register after May 2015. 
 
Figure 4. Proportion (%) of pulmonary TB cases diagnosed at BPC bacteriologically 
confirmed, by week of diagnosis. 
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Treatment information 
Of the 1450 cases in the register, 1377 (95%) were reported to have been commenced 
on DOT.   
The type of treatment regimen that cases were assigned to is shown in Figure 5 and was 
recorded for 1447/1450 (99%) of all TB cases. The treatment regime reflects the 
category of the TB case. Category I includes all new bacteriologically confirmed cases 
that were not multidrug-resistant (MDR) cases. Category II includes all previously 
treated cases (relapse, failure, loss to follow-up and ‘others’) whose GeneXpert® 
MTB/RIF (Mycobacterium tuberculosis/rifampicin resistance) result has been reported 
as “T” which means MTB detected and rifampicin resistance not detected.  
 
Figure 5. Treatment regimens for TB cases diagnosed at BPC (n=1450). 
Comparison of key characteristics of adults and children diagnosed with TB at 
BPC 
Sixteen percent (n=228) of TB cases were aged under 15 years. The demographics and 
risk factors of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and adults are shown in Table 7. 
Of note, children were more likely to come from a rural area and were more likely to be 
identified through contact tracing activities.   
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Table 7. Demographics and risk factors of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and 
adults.  
Demo- 
graphic 
Children Adults 
OR* 
95% CI
†
 p 
value 
Cases % Total Cases % Total    
Male 111 51 219 629 51 1231 1.0 0.8-1.3 0.91 
Inpatient 95 48 197 925 77 1197 0.4 0.3-0.4 <0.01 
Rural resident 31 14 219 104 8 1231 1.6 1.1-2.2 <0.01 
Second 
address in 
rural area 28 13 219 268 22 1231 0.6 0.4-0.8 <0.01 
Known contact 
with  77 51 151 313 33 962 1.9 1.4-2.6 <0.01 
Evidence of 
BCG vaccine 70 63 112 341 41 823 2.1 1.5-3.0 <0.01 
Malnutrition 68 49 139 185 20 916 3.0 2.2-4.1 <0.01 
Identified 
through 
contact tracing 20 11 190 7 1 1166 5.8 4.4-7.5 <0.01 
Previous TB 4 2 168 194 19 1048 0.1
‡
 0.0-0.3 <0.01 
Newly 
diagnosed or 
previous HIV 
positive 2 1 219 15 1 1231 0.7
‡
 0.2-2.9 1.0 
* OR = Odds Ratio  
† CI = Confidence Interval 
‡ Fisher’s exact 
 
Symptoms and health seeking behaviour 
Table 8 shows symptoms of children and adults diagnosed with TB at the BPC. For 
both children and adults cough was the most common presenting symptom. Children 
were more likely to be febrile upon presentation than adults and present with systemic 
symptoms. Adults were more likely to present with a productive cough, haemoptysis 
and weight loss. 
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Table 8. Symptoms of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and adults.  
Symptom 
Children Adults 
OR* 95% CI
†
 
p 
value Cases % Total Cases % Total 
Cough 149 79 188 917 82 1123 0.9 0.6-1.2 0.43 
Productive 
cough 24 13 178 617 56 1105 0.2 0.1-0.2 <0.01 
Haemoptysis 12 7 179 409 37 1107 0.1 0.1-0.3 <0.01 
Dyspnoea 54 30 180 410 37 1104 0.8 0.6-1.0 0.06 
Weight loss 117 63 186 840 76 1109 0.6 0.5-0.8 <0.01 
Night sweats 82 45 184 541 49 1102 0.9 0.7-1.1 0.26 
Fever 80 44 181 461 42 1104 1.1 0.8-1.4 0.54 
Lethargy 51 29 178 589 54 1095 0.4 0.3-0.5 <0.01 
Tachycardia 49 45 110 182 20 901 2.7 1.9-3.8 <0.01 
Systemic 
symptoms 
present 62 56 110 309 34 901 2.2 1.6-3.2 <0.01 
Febrile on 
presentation 38 35 110 182 20 901 1.9 1.3-2.7 <0.01 
Lymphadeno-
pathy 19 10 182 136 12 1111 0.9 0.5-1.3 0.49 
Abdominal pain 
or discomfort 6 3 219 67 5 1231 0.5 0.2-1.2 0.09 
Pallor 6 5 110 75 8 902 0.7 0.3-1.5 0.30 
Chest pain 4 2 219 226 18 1231 0.1
‡
 0.0-0.3 <0.01 
Vomiting 3 1 219 21 2 1231 0.8
‡
 0.3-2.4 1.0 
Musculoskeletal 
pain 2 1 219 154 13 1231 0.1
‡
 0.0-0.3 <0.01 
Headache 1 0 219 59 5 1231 0.1
‡
 0.0-0.7 <0.01 
Back pain 0 0 219 115 9 1231 0.0
§
 0.0-0.2
§
 <0.01 
Hoarse voice 0 0 219 15 1 1231 0.6
§
 0.0-3.2
§
 0.57 
* OR = Odds Ratio  
† CI = Confidence Interval 
‡ Fisher’s exact 
§ Odds ratio (OR) and 95% confidence intervals calculated using exact logistic regression 
 
The use of traditional medicine (aimoruk Timor) was reported by 2.7 (95% CI 1.6-4.9, 
p<0.001) times as many adults (307/771, 40%) compared to children (14/94, 15%). The 
median duration of symptoms prior to diagnosis for children was 30 days (range 0–5475 
days) compared to a median of 60 days (range 0-10220 days) for adults (p<0.0001). 
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Diagnostic information 
Table 9 shows diagnostic information recorded in the BPC TB register on children and 
adults diagnosed with TB at the BPC. A chest x-ray was performed for less than half of 
all cases, but when taken was more likely to be abnormal for adults when compared to 
children. Pulmonary TB was more likely to be bacteriologically confirmed in adult 
cases compared to paediatric cases.  
Table 9. Diagnostic information of TB cases diagnosed at BPC in children and adults.  
Characteristic 
Children Adults 
OR* 
95% 
CI
†
 
p  
value Cases % Total Cases % Total 
Chest x-ray 
performed 82 47 176 467 42 1102 1.2 0.9-1.5 0.29 
Abnormal x-ray 
finding 57 69 82 377 81 467 0.6 0.4-0.9 0.02 
Pulmonary TB  163 74 219 855 69 1231 1.2 0.9-1.6 0.13 
Extrapulmonary 
TB 48 22 219 292 24 1231 0.9 0.7-1.2 0.56 
Pulmonary and 
extrapulmonary 
TB 7 3 219 83 7 1231 0.5 0.2-1.0 0.04 
Sputum smear 
sample 
collected 21 10 219 904 73 1231 0.1 0.0-0.1 <0.01 
Sputum smear 
positive 5 24 21 377 42 904 0.4 0.2-0.8 0.09 
Confirmed 
Pulmonary TB
‡
  7 4 170 499 53 938 0.1 0.0-0.1 <0.01 
HIV Test 
performed 90 48 187 964 82 1169 0.3 0.2-0.3 <0.01 
* OR = Odds Ratio  
† CI = Confidence Interval 
‡ confirmed by microscopy, PCR or culture. 
 
Results – Rationalisation of data and creation of a data dictionary 
The data rationalisation aspect of the project resulted in a reduction in the amount and 
type of data that will be recorded for future cases. Specifically there will be fewer 
variables recorded and of these, fewer will be recorded with free text (Table 10).  
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Table 10. Summary of key characteristics of new BPC TB database after data cleaning. 
 Pre-data 
cleaning 
Post-data 
cleaning 
Number of variables 165 57 
Number of string variables 138 20 
Number of date variables 18 13 
Number of categorical variables recorded as free text 84 0 
Number of numerical variables 28 37 
Number of integer variables 5 30 
Number of byte variables 19 4 
Number of float variables 3 3 
 
In addition to the 57 routine variables contained within the new database, there are 365 
variables which are intended to record the date and result of DOT delivery.   
A copy of the data dictionary for the new TB registry database can be found in 
Appendix 1. A new data collection form based on this data dictionary has been 
developed but is yet to be implemented (Appendix 4). 
Results –Epi InfoTM as a tool to host the BPC TB dataset 
A trial of Epi Info
TM
  
Creating forms for data entry, and the subsequent database using Epi Info
TM
 was an 
intuitive process and there was no major difficulty encountered during this process.  
However, when attempting to create forms for data input (Figure 6), long delays were 
often experienced while pages were loading and in some instances Epi Info
TM
 became 
unresponsive and had to be shut down. These problems were exacerbated when forms 
were made more complex (i.e. recorded more than demographics, symptomology and 
some simple diagnostic characteristics.) Similar issues with long delays and the 
program crashing were experienced when I attempted data entry, as well as 
unacceptable lag times between keystrokes and outputs appearing on the screen which 
can lead to potential transcription errors. I consulted Dr Francis, and we agreed that this 
would be unacceptable and frustrating in a busy, resource limited setting such as BPC 
and also a potential source of error and low data quality. Further attempts to develop a 
database using Epi Info
TM
 were abandoned. 
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Figure 6. Screenshot of Epi Info
TM
 – create form module. 
 
 
Figure 7. Screenshot of Epi Info
TM
 – enter data module (not responding). 
 
Developing a custom built BPC TB database  
After abandoning Epi Info
TM
, Dr Josh Francis and I met online with Dr Piyawat 
Sukijthamapan, executive director of the US based NGO, Project Plus One (PP1).
24
 The 
PP1 organisation assists the BPC by supporting projects that strengthen the clinic’s 
ability to diagnose, treat and manage TB cases. The organisation stated that they had 
members/volunteers studying information technology at Brandeis University in Boston 
Massachusetts and that these students might be willing to develop a simple database and 
reporting system specific to the clinic’s needs. Despite this initial meeting, there was no 
further progress in terms of engaging these students. 
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Trial of REDCap
TM
 as a host for the BPC TB database 
Mr Christian James began working at the NT CDC in 2016 and had experience 
designing and modifying databases, having worked previously for Rheumatic Heart 
Disease Australia. He was asked to modify the existing Microsoft
®
 Office Access
®
 
database to accommodate the cleaned dataset, using the new data dictionary that was 
developed as a result of this data analysis project. However, he suggested that 
REDCap
TM
 could be suitable to host the BPC TB database. REDCap
TM
 (Research 
Electronic Data CAPture) is a free, secure, web-based program designed to record 
research data and export it to common data analysis packages. Data are housed in a 
cloud and simultaneous multi-user access is possible. A screenshot of the data entry 
screen for demographics is shown in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8. Screenshot of REDCap
TM
 – data entry mode. 
 
The variables created through data cleaning which are intended to record the date and 
result of DOT delivery transcribed simply and easily to the REDCap
TM
 database. A 
screenshot of the treatment module of the BPC TB database in REDCap
TM
 is shown in 
Figure 9. At the time of writing, the database is still under construction and will be 
piloted at the clinic in mid-2017. 
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Figure 9. Screenshot of REDCap
TM
 – treatment module. 
 
Discussion  
Data quality 
The most obvious finding from this project in terms of data quality was the large 
amount of incomplete data in the database. Most of this incomplete data related to 
treatment outcomes. This reflects the challenges associated with contemporaneous data 
entry at the clinic, and the fact that treatment outcomes only become apparent after 
several months of treatment. Although the information was absent from the database, it 
is contained on paper forms in the clinic and used practically for the follow up of 
patients on therapy. If a new registry is to be used to monitor treatment adherence and 
outcomes, the system needs to facilitate and prompt regular inputs regarding treatment 
that should be entered in real time rather than at the completion of the treatment period. 
This approach can potentially provide additional benefits in terms of early identification 
of treatment default. In the meantime, the absence of this database is mitigated by 
recording of operational data on paper forms. 
The quality of data actually recorded within the database was compromised by most 
variables being free-text entry. The previous data collection form (Appendix 2) 
contained many free text fields which were completed by clinicians while seeing a 
patient and then entered into the database weeks or months later by another clinician or 
by an administration officer. In a clinic with a high turnover of staff, including 
volunteer staff from various countries who speak different languages, this old form 
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created potential for misinterpretation and misunderstanding of questions from the 
person completing the form as well as potential misinterpretation of responses and 
transcription errors from those persons entering data from the form into the database. A 
specific example of this is where TB medications were recorded. There were 126 unique 
inputs for TB medications prescribed when only 4-5 drugs are actually stocked at the 
clinic. This makes it difficult to immediately analyse and interpret data in a systematic 
manner. By creating a form with categorical responses wherever possible, we have 
improved data quality and streamlined data entry.  
The project identified an opportunity to rationalise the number of variables recorded in 
the database and to discontinue recording redundant variables. This rationalisation of 
variables was done in consultation with the main users of the system and also took into 
account compulsory regular reporting requirements to the NTP in Timor-Leste as well 
as a desire to streamline the database. An example of unnecessary variables that were 
removed from the database were those that measured symptomology as there was no 
requirement to report these to the NTP, and analysis of this information did not translate 
to improved public health or clinical outcomes. Although these symptoms may assist 
the clinician in diagnosis, there is therefore little value in recording them in the register. 
There was an argument that collecting this information was important to determine 
whether the spectrum of illness in Timor-Leste was different to that in the rest of the 
world, however, this data analysis project showed that the range of symptoms at BPC is 
typical of TB presentations around the world
4
. It was therefore recommended that 
symptomology no longer be reported in the BPC TB registry. 
The creation of a data dictionary which controls and defines inputs will vastly improve 
the quality of the data in the register and facilitate timely and easier analysis. The new 
data collection form/instrument was created and was based on the content of the new 
data dictionary. The expected public health impact of this project is that data will be 
able to be analysed and used in real time, for reporting to the NTP and ultimately to 
monitor people receiving TB treatment or contacts receiving preventative therapy.  
Creating a new BPC TB database 
Despite its potential advantages, in an environment with limited resources, Epi Info
TM
 is 
unsuitable for use as a tool to host this large dataset. Epi Info
TM 
did not provide a better 
alternative to recording treatment outcomes than the current paper based system. This is 
not appropriate for the BPC which has limited physical and human resources and where 
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users have low computer literacy. Epi Info
TM
 would have potentially shifted the 
complexity of the paper based system to a digital format and is therefore inappropriate 
at BPC.  
The production of a database using REDCap
TM
 was underway at the time of writing. 
The data entry pages appear simple and are easy to use and there is an ability to restrict 
users’ access to only certain sections of a patient entry. This is appropriate for users at 
BPC. For instance, health workers involved only in the provision of DOT to cases and 
contacts could have their access restricted to only the treatment page of the patient’s 
record in REDCap.
TM
 This would not only protect data in other parts of the patient 
record from being inadvertently edited, but also streamlines and simplifies data input in 
a setting with limited resources and for staff with limited education or experience with 
computer software.  
REDCap
TM
 has ability to filter patient records based on information and dates which 
provides potential benefits for workers at BPC to plan their workloads particularly by 
identifying patients who require DOTs, patients who are at risk because of missing 
DOTs and patients who require sampling, screening or other follow up. Currently this is 
done by pulling paper charts but if REDCap
TM 
can be utilised in the same way, patient 
treatment adherence and patients at risk has the potential to be determined in real-time 
at BPC. 
REDCap
TM
 does not appear to have the ability to automatically generate the reports that 
are required by the NTP on a regular basis. Analyses such as this would need to be done 
by extracting data from the database and analysing using Stata
®
 or another similar 
package. Unfortunately this means that increased computer literacy needs to be 
achieved by staff at BPC or REDCap
TM
 should not be used for this purpose. 
Alternatively this extraction and analysis can be done remotely because the data is 
stored in a cloud rather than having to be downloaded and emailed to someone for 
analysis. This however is not seen as building local capacity and the clinic would still 
depend on outsiders with Stata
®
 proficiency.  
Epidemiology of TB at BPC 
TB is common in Timor-Leste. A large proportion of cases diagnosed at BPC have 
either a primary or secondary address outside of the capital city of Dili. This reflects 
both the disparate population in Timor-Leste and the reliance of the rural population on 
Dili-based health services.  
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For both adults and children, a chest x-ray was taken in fewer than half of cases. There 
is currently no ability to take x-rays at BPC and access to publicly funded x-ray services 
has been challenging historically. It would be worthwhile for BPC to have the ability to 
perform chest x-rays onsite given the amount of TB it manages, however purchasing a 
machine would be impossible without a large donation. 
Sputum samples for microscopic examination are collected at a higher rate from adults 
(73%) compared to paediatric cases (14%) but this is not surprising when considering 
the difficulty in obtaining positive sputum smear microscopy samples from children.
2
 
That being said, the positivity rate is only 23% in children and 42% in adults even when 
a sample is collected, with lower rates of positivity expected in children anyway. The 
low rate of bacteriologically confirmed TB in both adults and children can be improved 
in the future by following standard specimen collection guidelines and by selectively 
using the GeneXpert
®
 PCR technology at the clinic in line with NTP guidelines, which 
is to use the GeneXpert
®
 as the first line of bacteriological testing when diagnosing 
children. GeneXpert
®
 testing is 36-44% more sensitive than sputum microscopy for 
diagnosing TB.
25
  
The accuracy of diagnosis of TB in Timor-Leste may be improved by increasing access 
to x-ray services and appropriately using GeneXpert
®
 technology, henceforth reducing 
the number of cases diagnosed on the basis of clinical symptoms alone. 
A cough was the most common symptom experienced by both adults and children who 
were diagnosed with TB at the BPC. It may however be a symptom that many adult TB 
cases overlooked before finally presenting to the clinic, with many perhaps attributing it 
to tobacco use. This may also contribute to the longer delay in seeking treatment seen in 
adults when compared to children. The clinic data reports that only 23% of adult cases 
diagnosed at the clinic are tobacco smokers which is likely to represent under-reporting, 
given the WHO estimates that two-thirds of adults in the country are daily smokers.
26
 It 
is possible that cases are likely to self-report that they are not tobacco smokers in order 
to increase the likelihood of attaining treatment.  
Another potential reason for adults presenting later to the BPC was that they were more 
likely to take traditional Timorese medicine (aimoruk Timor) than children. This might 
be explained by adults prioritising the health and wellbeing of children and also by 
parents not being aware of their children’s or their own symptoms actually being 
manifestations of TB. This could also be in part due to an inability to access to 
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healthcare, especially outside of Dili
27
 which may lead people to source more readily 
available, traditional treatments for illness.  
Timor-Leste surveillance data from 2014 includes 4090 TB cases, of which 10% were 
aged less than 15 years (National Tuberculosis Program 2014 surveillance data). The 
proportion of TB patients at BPC who are children is 1.5 times the proportion diagnosed 
in the rest of the country (OR 1.5. 95% CI 1.3-1.8, p<0.01). There are several reasons 
that this could be the case. One is that the population presenting to BPC may be 
different to the population seeking healthcare elsewhere in Timor-Leste. This difference 
may also represent under detection of paediatric TB in other health facilities in Timor-
Leste. As discussed above the majority of diagnoses of TB, and particularly paediatric 
TB at BPC are made clinically, and there are a large number of international volunteer 
doctors, including infectious disease specialists and paediatricians regularly working at 
the clinic who are skilled in the detection of symptomology of TB in the absence of 
laboratory testing, and who have trained local doctors at the clinic in this. Bacterial tests 
are generally less useful in diagnosing TB in children than in adults (REF), and at other 
Timor-Leste health care facilities outside of BPC these tests are more relied on for 
diagnosis. Therefore the lower rates of paediatric TB notified in the rest of Timor-Leste 
may relate to under detection due to a reliance on diagnostic tests, particularly sputum 
smear microscopy and the lack of a consistent clinical case definition.  
Children under 15 years of age were more likely to have known contact with a TB case 
compared to adults (11% versus 1%) which is unsurprising considering contact tracing 
of child contacts of newly diagnosed TB cases is a stated priority of the NTP. It also 
may be because children are more likely to be contact traced and those who are 
symptomatic, which are more likely to be children, end up being diagnosed and entered 
in the registry. This is why children under 15 years of age were more likely to be 
identified through contact tracing activities than adults. Almost a quarter (22%) of adult 
cases had a second residence in the foho (rural areas and mountains). This highlights the 
importance of contact tracing paediatric contacts, including in rural areas, and to ensure 
that resources are allocated for this. 
Until access to GeneXpert
®
 PCR technology is improved, there needs to be improved 
training of health workers, particularly in the areas outside of Dili in recognising and 
diagnosing clinical TB. There is also a dire need for free public x-ray services to 
become more available not only in rural areas but also in Dili where currently all 
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patients need to access the service at the national hospital in Dili (Hospital Nacional 
Guido Valadares), which is historically difficult. Worldwide in 2014, 10% (1 million) 
of the 9.6 million estimated people diagnosed with TB were children.
2
 This suggests 
that TB affects the population of Timor-Leste much the same as it does the worldwide 
population. With a young population and high TB transmission rates, prevention and 
control strategies are essential to reduce paediatric TB in Timor-Leste. 
Major limitations of this project included the quality of the data, particularly the amount 
of missing data.  
The data only represented those patients who were diagnosed with TB at the BPC 
between October 2013 and September 2015 and who had their details entered into the 
registry. It did not include those patients diagnosed with TB whose record was not 
entered into the registry, nor did it include those patients who were diagnosed with TB 
prior to October 2013. There were no patients entered into the registry after May 2015 
due to the delays in data entry. Likewise, a large proportion of patients in the registry 
were diagnosed based on clinical symptoms only and this could introduce a potential 
selection bias. 
The absence of a data dictionary means that there was great potential for measurement 
bias. The new data dictionary and database resulting from this project will improve the 
accuracy of future analysis. 
The data analysis highlights the need for improved diagnosis of TB in Timor-Leste, 
particularly by increasing access to x-ray services and appropriate use of GeneXpert
®
 
technology. This may improve the accuracy of consistency of clinical diagnosis and 
allow organisms with antimicrobial resistance to be detected early. The project also 
highlights the need for devolved health care services, not just for diagnosis but also for 
public health and prevention activities. 
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Conclusion  
The aim of this data analysis project was to describe the epidemiology of TB at the BPC 
in Timor-Leste.  
This data analysis project exposed the BPC TB register as an ad hoc database which 
attempted to record too many variables, many of which were ill-defined and recorded by 
free-text. There was a large amount of missing and nonsensical data which rendered the 
registry difficult to analyse rapidly and near impossible to utilise for immediate public 
health action. The BPC TB register needs to collect appropriate information which can 
be used to drive public health action. 
Paediatric TB is commonly diagnosed at the BPC. It is important that TB treatment and 
contact tracing programs continue and include rural areas, especially to continue to 
identify children for preventative treatment. Bacteriological confirmation of TB, 
particularly in children is difficult but can be improved by selectively using PCR 
technology, in line with NTP guidelines. 
The expected public health outcomes of this data analysis are the creation of a data 
dictionary for the TB registry, a new questionnaire for recording patient information and 
ultimately a new and appropriate database for patients diagnosed with TB at BPC. A 
plan will be made to evaluate this system once it has been operating for at least 1 year. 
Recommendations 
The government of Timor-Leste and other non-government organisations need to 
improve the diagnosis of TB in Timor-Leste. This may be achieved in part by increasing 
access to x-ray services and appropriately using GeneXpert
®
 technology. Health care 
services in Timor-Leste need to be devolved from Dili, to improve diagnostic services 
as well as public health and prevention activities.  
The BPC should implement the data dictionary and data collection form developed from 
this project. An evaluation and review of the BPC TB registry should be undertaken 1 
year after the implementation of the new data collection and monitoring system. 
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Outcomes 
Public health outcome Status 
Creation of data dictionary for BPC TB registry.  
Creation of case proforma/questionnaire for patients 
diagnosed with TB at the BPC. 
 
Creation of a new database to host the BPC TB registry  
Nearing completion 
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Appendix 1. Data dictionary for new Bairo Pite Clinic Tuberculosis register.  
Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
registrationnumber BPC TB Registration 
number 
The registration number 
assigned to each case of 
TB diagnosed/treated at 
Bairo Pite Clinic.  
string     
surname Surname Surname string     
givenname Given name(s) Given name(s) string     
sex Sex Sex numeric 0=Female, 1=Male, 
999=Unknown 
  
dateofbirth Date of birth Date of birth string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
age Age in years (if DOB 
unknown) 
Age in years (if DOB 
unknown) - for children 
enter to 1 decimal place 
numeric    Enter to 1 
decimal place 
phone Phone number Phone number string   8 digits, no 
spaces. (e.g. 
99999999) 
employed Employment status Employment status numeric 0=Unemployed, 1=Employed, 
2=Preschool/kindergarten, 
999=Unknown 
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
bairosuco Address (suco/bairo) Description of physical 
address - street, road, 
suco/bairo. 
string   Enter patient's 
street and 
suco/bairo 
address if 
known 
currentdistrict District Current district of 
residence 
numeric 0=Dili, 1=Aileu, 2=Ainaro, 
3=Baucau, 4=Bobonaro, 5=Cova 
Lima, 6=Ermera, 7=Lautem, 
8=Liquica, 9=Manatuto, 
10=Manufahi, 11=Oecussi, 
12=Viqueque, 999=Unknown  
  
previoustb Previous TB Previously diagnosed with 
TB? 
numeric 0=No, 1=Yes, 999=Unknown   
previoustbsite Previous TB type Previous type of TB numeric 0=No previous TB, 1=Pulmonary 
TB only, 2=Extrapulmonary TB 
only, 3=Pulmonary AND 
extrapulmonary TB, 
999=Unknown 
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
previoustboutcome1 Previous TB outcome Previous TB outcome numeric 0 =No previous TB, 1=Didn't 
complete treatment/defaulted, 
2=Completed treatment - 
unknown if cured, 3=Completed 
treatment - cured, 4=Completed 
treatment - not cured, 
999=Unknown 
  
knowncontactwithtb Contact with TB Is there any contact with a 
known TB case? 
numeric 0=No, 1=Yes - household, 2=Yes 
- other, 999=Unknown  
  
knowncontactmdr Contact with MDR TB Is there any contact with a 
known MDR TB case? 
numeric 0=No, 1=Yes - household, 2=Yes 
- other, 999=Unknown  
  
bcg Evidence of BCG Is there any evidence of a 
BCG having been given? 
numeric 0=No evidence, 1=Documented 
evidence, 2=Scar present, 
999=Unknown 
  
identifiedthroughcontacttracing Identified through contact 
tracing 
Was this new case 
identified through contact 
tracing activities of another 
case? 
numeric 0=No, 1=Yes, 999=Unknown   
hxsmoking Smoking status Smoking status numeric     
pregnant Pregnant Currently pregnant? numeric 0=No, 1=Yes, 999=Unknown   
diabetes Diabetic Diabetic? numeric 0=No, 1=Yes, 999=Unknown   
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
onsetdate Earliest known onset 
date 
Earlies known onset date 
of symptoms - if unknown 
enter an estimate 
numeric 0=Never smoked, 1=Former 
smoker, 2=Current smoker, 
999=Unknown 
  
presentationdatebpc Date of first presentation 
to BPC 
Date of first presentation to 
BPC with symptoms above 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy First date 
presented to 
BPC for 
treatment 
diagnosisdate Date TB diagnosed Date of TB diagnosis 
based on examination  
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy Date diagnosed 
with TB based 
on examination 
treatmentdate Date treatment 
commenced 
Date TB treatment 
commenced 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy Date treatment 
for TB began 
weight Weight (kg) Weight in kg numeric     
height height (cm) Height in cm numeric     
ss1date Sputum smear 1 date Date of sputum smear 
sample 1 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
ss1q Sputum Smear 1 quality Quality of sputum smear 
sample 1 
numeric 0=No specimen collected, 
1=Saliva, 2=Mucopurulent, 
3=Blood stained, 999=Unknown 
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
ss1r Sputum smear 1 result Sputum smear sample 1 
result 
numeric 0=Negative, 1=Scanty (0-9), 2 
=1+, 3=2+, 4=3+, 77=No 
specimen collected, 
999=Unknown  
  
ss2date Sputum smear 2 date Date of sputum smear 
sample 2 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
ss2q Sputum Smear 2 quality Quality of sputum smear 
sample 2 
numeric 0=No specimen collected, 
1=Saliva, 2=Mucopurulent, 
3=Blood stained, 999=Unknown 
  
ss2r Sputum smear 2 result Sputum smear sample 2 
result 
numeric 0=Negative, 1=Scanty (0-9), 2 
=1+, 3=2+, 4=3+, 77=No 
specimen collected, 
999=Unknown  
  
ss3date Sputum smear 3 date Date of sputum smear 
sample 3 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
ss3q Sputum Smear 3 quality Quality of sputum smear 
sample 3 
numeric 0=No specimen collected, 
1=Saliva, 2=Mucopurulent, 
3=Blood stained, 999=Unknown 
  
ss3r Sputum smear 3 result Sputum smear sample 3 
result 
numeric 0=Negative, 1=Scanty (0-9), 2 
=1+, 3=2+, 4=3+, 77=No 
specimen collected, 
999=Unknown  
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
nssdate Non sputum smear date Date of non sputum smear 
sample 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
nonsssite Non sputum smear site Site of non sputum smear 
sample 
numeric 0=No non-sputum sample 
collected, 1=Sputum, 2=Lymph 
node, 3=CSF, 4=Pleuritic fluid, 
5=Joint aspirate, 6=Pus swab, 
7=Urine, 8=Faeces, 9=Peritoneal 
fluid, 10=Other, 999=Unknown, 
77=Not done 
  
nonssr Non sputum smear result Non sputum smear sample 
result 
numeric 0=Negative, 1=Scanty (0-9), 2 
=1+, 3=2+, 4=3+, 77=No 
specimen collected, 
999=Unknown  
  
genxpertdate1 GeneXpert
®
 sample 1 
date 
Date of GeneXpert
®
 
sample 1 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
genxpertsite1 GeneXpert
®
 sample 1 
site 
Site of GeneXpert
®
 sample 
1 
numeric 0=No non-sputum sample 
collected, 1=Sputum, 2=Lymph 
node, 3=CSF, 4=Pleuritic fluid, 
5=Joint aspirate, 6=Pus swab, 
7=Urine, 8=Faeces, 9=Peritoneal 
fluid, 10=Other, 999=Unknown, 
77=Not done 
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
genxpertr1 GeneXpert
®
 sample 1 
result 
Result of GeneXpert
®
 
sample 1 
numeric 77=Not done, 0=N (MTB Not 
detected), 1=T (MTB detected, 
rifampicin resistance not 
detected), 2=TI (MTB detected, 
rifampicin resistance 
indeterminate), 3=RR (MTB 
detected, rifampicin resistance 
detected), 4=I (invalid/no 
result/error), 999=Unknown 
  
genxpertdate2 GeneXpert
®
 sample 2 
date 
Date of GeneXpert
®
 
sample 2 
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
genxpertsite2 GeneXpert
®
 sample 2 
site 
Site of GeneXpert
®
  
sample 2 
numeric 0=No non-sputum sample 
collected, 1=Sputum, 2=Lymph 
node, 3=CSF, 4=Pleuritic fluid, 
5=Joint aspirate, 6=Pus swab, 
7=Urine, 8=Faeces, 9=Peritoneal 
fluid, 10=Other, 999=Unknown, 
77=Not done 
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
genxpertr2 GeneXpert
®
 sample 2 
result 
Result of GeneXpert
®
 
sample 2 
numeric 77=Not done, 0=N (MTB Not 
detected), 1=T (MTB detected, 
rifampicin resistance not 
detected), 2=TI (MTB detected, 
rifampicin resistance 
indeterminate), 3=RR (MTB 
detected, rifampicin resistance 
detected), 4=I (invalid/no 
result/error), 999=Unknown 
  
cxrdate Chest x-ray date Date of chest x-ray string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
xrayresult Chest x-ray result Result of chest x-ray numeric 77=Not done, 0=Normal, 
1=Abnormal - suggestive of other 
illness, 2=Abnormal - suggestive 
of TB, 999=Unknown  
  
culturedate Culture date Date of culture sample string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
culturesite Culture site Site of culture sample numeric 0=No non-sputum sample 
collected, 1=Sputum, 2=Lymph 
node, 3=CSF, 4=Pleuritic fluid, 
5=Joint aspirate, 6=Pus swab, 
7=Urine, 8=Faeces, 9=Peritoneal 
fluid, 10=Other, 999=Unknown, 
77=Not done 
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
culturer Culture result Result of culture sample result 77=Not done, 999=Unknown, 
0=No growth, 1=(1-9) <10 
colonies, 2=(+) 10-100 colonies, 
3=(++) >100 colonies, 4=(+++) 
innumerable or confluent growth 
  
tbcategory Diagnosis Diagnostic category of TB 
infection 
numeric 1=Pulmonary TB only, 
2=Extrapulmonary TB Only, 
3=Pulmonary and 
extrapulmonary TB, 
999=Unknown 
  
ntpcategory Registration category National Tuberculosis 
Program (NTP) category 
numeric 1=New case, 2=Relapsed case, 
3=Defaulted or failed to complete 
previous treatment regiment, 
4=Treatment after loss to follow 
up, 5=Other, 999=Unknown 
  
numberofhouseholdcontacts Number of household 
contacts (as stated by 
index case or guardian) 
Number of household 
contacts nominated by the 
case or their guardian 
numeric     
householdcontactsunder5 Number of household 
contacts <5 years of age 
Number of household 
contacts under 5 years of 
age nominated by the case 
or their guardian 
numeric     
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
regimen Treatment regimen 
category 
Category of TB treatment 
regimen according to NTP 
guidelines 
numeric 1=Category I, 2=Category II, 
3=MDR - TB, 4=Labarik/child, 
5=Other, 999=Unknown 
  
continuationphasesite Place administering 
continuation phase 
therapy/Current DOT 
provider 
The health centre that is 
managing the continuation 
phase of the case's 
treatment 
text     
dd1 - dd365 Date of DOT Day The date of the DOT 
treatment - written each 
day a DOT is given  
string Format is dd/mm/yyyy   
dotresult1 - dotresult365 DOT outcome Enter the outcome of each 
day of the DO therapy 
numeric 0=Medication not taken, 
1=Medication swallowed under 
direct observation, 2=Medication 
supplied, 999=Unknown 
  
completedintensivephase Completed intensive 
phase 
Completed the intensive 
phase of treatment (after 2 
months) 
numeric 0=No, 1=Yes, 999=Unknown   
completedcontinuationphase Completed continuation 
phase 
Completed the continuation 
phase of treatment (after 6 
months) 
numeric 0=No, 1=Yes, 999=Unknown   
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Variable Name Question on Form Definition Data format Data coding Guide for use 
treatmentoutcome Treatment outcome 
classification 
What was the final 
outcome of the TB 
treatment 
numeric 0=Didn't complete 
treatment/defaulted, 
1=Completed treatment - 
unknown if cured, 2=Completed 
treatment - cured, 3=Completed 
treatment - treatment failed, 
4=Died, 5=Transferred out to 
another health centre, 6=Lost to 
follow up, 999=Unknown 
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Appendix 2. Old data collection instrument for Bairo Pite Clinic 
Tuberculosis register  
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Appendix 3. Old Bairo Pite Clinic tuberculosis treatment card/form.  
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Appendix 4. New data collection instrument for Bairo Pite Clinic 
Tuberculosis register  
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Appendix 5. Poster: “Tuberculosis in children and adults diagnosed at 
the Bairo Pite Clinic Dili, Timor-Leste, 2013-2015” 
 
Presented at the 8th TEPHINET Bi-regional Scientific Conference, Siem Reap, 
Cambodia, November 2016. 
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Appendix 6. Poster: “Paediatric tuberculosis in Timor-Leste: 
Opportunities to improve recognition, diagnosis and prevention” 
 
Presented by Dr Charlotte Hall at the 47
th
 Union World Conference on Lung Health, 
Liverpool, United Kingdom, October 2016. 
 
 
